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INTRODUCTION 
There are two broad groups of methods used to forecast future 
action of individual stocks and the market as a whole as measured by leading 
1 
market indices such as the Dow Jones Industrial Average . These two 
methods are known as the technical and fundamental approaches. 
A fundamentalist bases his investment decisions on a study of 
economic conditions plus an analysis of the basic position of specific 
companies. iy watching statistics on paperboard production, steel out-
put, unemployment, construction, department store sales, automobile 
purchases, capital expenditures, etc., the fundamentalist expects to be 
able to forecast the level of future business acti~ity with a reasonable 
degree of accuracy. Such predictions are, in turn, expected by the 
fundamentalists to permit them to forecast correctly the Dow's basic 
trend. 
In deciding what issues to purchase when the basic trend is 
up, the fundamentalist concerns himself with earnings, dividends, price-
2 
earnings ratios, research expenditures, capital outlays, financial 
position, relati ve position in the industry, popularity of products, 
quality of management, etc. He naturally believes a study of these 
factors is likely to enable him to select those securities most likely 
to perform well. 
1. 
2. 
Hereafter, this Average will be referred to as the Dow. 
Price earnings ratios are normally derived by dividing the price of a 
stock by either the latest reported annual earnings or a forecast of 
profits for the current year. 
A true technician would disagree completely and would dis -
regard the fundamental factors mentioned in the first sentence of the 
preceding paragraph. To trade successfully in an issue, knowledge of 
its price action and volume over a lengthy period of time plus its 
3 
ticker symbol would be all the information considered necessary by a 
confirmed technician. 
6. 
The technician feels that underlying causes of a stock's action 
normally are not generally known until some ~ime after they have been 
discounted in the market. In other words, if there is going to be 
good news published concerning a particular company, people close to 
the situation will have acted on this information long before it appears 
in print. Consequently, by the time the average individual is aware 
of the favorable developments, the market action of the stock will often 
have fully reflected them. 
In the case of bad news, exactly the reverse situation pre-
vails. Once the adverse information is available to the typical in-
vestor, the stock often will have declined substantially and it will be 
too late to sell. It has been the aut~or 's experience that it is fre-
quently advant ageous to sell when good news is announced and to buy on 
the announcement of bad news. 
Of course, an issue will often continue to trend upward follow-
ing the publication of favorable news such as a stock split , dividend 
3. 
Many broker 's offices today have ticker tapes on which all transactions 
on the New York and American Stock Exchanges are reported . The names 
of companies appearing on these tapes are abbreviated . These abbre-
viations are known as ticker~bols. For example, General Motors, has 
the symbol GM, General Electric GE, and American Viscose VIS. 
7. 
increase, or higher earnings. Also, the publication of adverse in-
formation such as lower earnings, a dividend cut, or contract cancellations 
will frequently be followed by still lower prices for the s tock. 
However, a technician would say that a further rise or decline 
had nothing to do with information just made public but was caused by 
other developments not known to the public. iy watching the market 
performance of an issue, the technician claims to be able to take advan-
4 
tage of new developments almost as soon as insiders, and long before 
the public knows what is occurring. 
As far as predicting the future action of the entire market 
is concerned, most technicians feel that a study of economic statistics 
is more ~ikely to be a hindrance than a help. Technicians hold this 
opanion because the market tends to discount business news several 
months before it appears as published data. They have developed various 
methods of forecas~ing the trend of the Dow which place no emphasis on 
business conditions. The best known of these methods are the Dow Theory, 
Drew's Odd Lot Studies, Lowry's Studies of iuying Power and Selling 
Pressure, Neill's Contrary Opinion Studies, and Granville's Studies of 
Barron 's Confidence Index. 
In addition to these pure technical systems, various money 
studies have also been developed. Of the money studies, the Harding 
Index and the iank Credit Analyst are the most widely read. These 
services are fundamental to the extent that the market position taken 
4 . 
Insiders are those who are especially close to a situation such as 
officers and directors and their friends and bankers. 
8 . 
is based on the outlook for business. They are technical to the ex-
tent that the position taken on the economy is based solely on a study 
of money figures, with no attention being paid to any other economic 
data. 
When the author attended college in the early 1950s, the 
5 
writer of the book used for the investment course expressed what seemed 
to be the typical viewpoint toward technical methods at that time. 
Only one technical approach was discussed in the book - - the Dow 
Theory - - which was indicated to be "probably the only technical 
6 
theory with much of any validity. " The viewpoint toward technical 
approaches taken by Professor iellemore was summed up in the following 
statement 11it is impossible accurately to predict general market move-
ments or the future movement pattern, especially the near-term move-
ments, of a particular stock on the basis of mathematical calculations 
7 
and charting . .. However, during recent years technical systems have 
gained a good deal of support in investment circles • . To obtain an 
idea of the current feeling toward technical methQds, the author inter-
viewed 36 people in ioston who do investment work. 
There are only two basic types of investors. Firstly, there 
are those who believe that since the basic trend of the market is up, 
5. 
6. 
Douglas Hamilton iellemore, Investments, (Norwood, Mass: Plimpton 
Press, 1953), 
Ibid., p. 346. 
7. 
Ibid., p. 342. 
the surest course to investment success is to purchase stocks of 
America's leading companies and then forget about them. Secondly, 
there are those who attempt to capitalize on minor and intermediate 
8 
moves by both the market as a whole and individual issues. It is only 
with this second group that we will concern outselves in this paper. 
Technical systems would naturally be of no use to people who fall in 
the former category. 
Those in the first group would generally be considered in-
vestors and those in the second category speculators or traders. It 
is unfortunate that the words speculator and trader have taken on an 
unfavorable connotation in many people's minds. As long as a logical 
method a s used, it seems to the author that attempting to benefit from 
intermediate moves in individual securities and the market as a whole 
is a sound investment approach. 
Certainly, such an approach has a great deal more merit than 
9 
simply buying "blue chip" stocks and holding them indefinitely, regard-
less of whether the market or the issue itself experiences a lengthy 
decline. At one time, United Fruit was considered one of the bluest 
9. 
of the "blue chips" and yet at the end of 1960 was selling for less than 
8 . 
9. 
For example, a person who had sold all his holdings early in 1960 
when the Dow was in the 680s and then bought back in October of that 
year when the Dow was in the 560s would have capitalized on that par-
ticular intermediate market decline to about the fullest extent possible. 
A "blue chip" stock is one representing ownership in a company \-lhich 
has long held an important position in the U.S. economy and has had a 
reasonably good earnings record. For example, Standard Oil of New 
Jersey, General Motors, du Pont, Union Carbide, and General Electric. 
one third its price at tne close of 1950. 
The author has seen the statement made that the difference 
between a speculator and an investor is that the former is willing to 
admit his mistakes and attempts to rectify them whereas the latter will 
continue to hold his poor acting stocks almost indefinitely. While 
this probably is not true in many instances, just because a person is 
a trader does not have t o mean that he is taking risky chances or is 
following less satisfactory investment procedures than a great many 
people who would be classified as investors. 
In this paper, the investment policies of one speculator who 
had an astounding amount of success will be briefly discussed. It 
will be shown that although he assumed above average risks, he adhered 
to a sound investment program, and his success was due largely to this 
fact. 
Several technical market systems and two technical approaches 
to individual issues will also be discussed. Because of space limit-
ations, it has bean necessary to be selective, and there are several 
methods which will not be covered. All those commented on will be 
ones which have a wide following and a creditable record. Noticeable 
by its absence will be the Dow Theory. A thorou8h study of the Theory 
10. 
has convinced the author that it is one technical approach which most 
investors should ignore, as it is likely to produce below average results. 
The technical market methods which will be covered are Drew's 
Odd Lot Studies, Barron's Confidence Index, Lowry's Reports, Neill's 
Letters of Contrary Opinion, and the Bank Credit Analyst. While we 
will regard the Bank Credit Analyst as a technical system, it should be 
remembered that it is fundamental to a certain extent. 
In the discussion of technical approaches to individual stocks 
there again will be one noticeable absence -- coverage of point and 
10 
figure charting . The author feels that point and figure charts are 
useful at times. However, he alao believes that, as a general rule, 
charts showing price action, volume, and time, and studies of relative 
market action are more valuable. These opinions are based on an ex-
tensive study of the three methods. 
The best explanation available on the use of odd lot figures 
11 
for market forecasting is found in Garfield Drew's book, while Joseph 
12 
Granville's book contains a discussion of Barron's Confidence Index. 
13 
In 1948 John Magee and Robert Edwards wrote a book on charts showing 
time, price action, and volume which is still considered to be the out-
standing work in this area. These three books can be obtained through 
most book stores or libraries, and were found by the author to be an 
excellent source of descriptive information. 
It is difficult to obtain descriptive material on the methods 
used by the Bank Credit Analyst, Neill's Letters of Contrary Opinion, 
10. 
11. 
Point and figure charts are concerned only with price action and 
ignore both volume and time. When a stock is advancing X's are 
generally used to indicate price changes while O's are used when 
an issue is declining. 
11. 
Garfield A. Drew, New Methods for Profit in the Stock Market . (Boston, 
Metcalf Press . rev. ed. 1954). 
12. 
13. 
Joseph E. Granville, A Strategy of Daily Stock Market Timing for 
Maximum Profit. (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey. Prentice-Hall, 1960). 
John Magee Jr. and Robert D. Edwards, Technical Analysis of Stock 
Trends. (Springfield, Massachusetts. Stock Trend Service, 1948). 
12. 
14 
Lowry's Reports, and Investors Research. Except for Neill, the only 
place where this material can be obtained is from the services themselves. 
In the case of Neill, the best source of explanatory information is 
Drew's book. 
After explaining each of the seven technical methods to be 
covered, we will describe the results achieved through their use. 
Copies of the Bank Credit Analyst, Neill's Letters of Contrary Opinion, 
and Drew's Odd Lot Studies covering a period of five years have been 
carefully studied as has the record of Lowry's Reports over the same in-
terval. Magee's record has been obtained for the period extending 
from the beginning of 1957 until October 15, 1960. 
Investors Research will be judged on the basis of the per-
formance of its model account from July 1, 1958, the date it was estab -
lished, until January 5, 1961. Barron's Confidence Index has to be 
judged almost entirely in retrospect. In his book, Mr. Granville pro-
vides a detailed description of the past record of the Index in fore-
casting market movements. 
Mr. Magee very kindly provided a brochure on his Stock Ad-
visory Service which shows the performance of the model account in 1957, 
1958, and 1959. He also provided the weekly bulletin of October 15, 
1960 which gives the record of the account from the beginning of 1960 
until that date. The record of Lowry's Reports, Drew Odd Lot Studies, 
14. 
Of the various investment services which use a relative market action 
approach such as Mansfield, American Investors, and Investors Research, 
the latter is the one the author will discuss. It is the only one 
which maintains a model account and thus seemed to be the logical choice. 
Bank Credit Analyst, and Neill's Letters of Contrary Opinion was obtained 
through a review of five years of each of these publications . The 
author was in the fortunate position of having ready access to this 
material. It could probably be secured by most people only by contact-
ing the publications. 
By studying the records of Investors Research, Magee, Neill, 
Drew, Bank Credit Analyst, Lowry's Reports, and Barron's Confidence In-
dex, we will be able to obtain a clear idea of what technical approaches 
can reasonably be expected to accomplish. To determine whether one 
should give these methods primary emphasis when planning an investment 
program, it will then be necessary only to obtain an idea of whether a 
fundamental approach would be likely to show more, or less favorable 
results. 
Some of the technical market forecasting methods which will 
be discussed are complicated ones as is the Magee method of forecasting 
the price trend of individual stocks. Fortunately, there is no reason 
for the reader to attempt to develop a degree of competence in handling 
the various systems comparable to that of the services which will be 
covered . If the reader becomes convinced of the merits of some of the 
approaches, he can subscribe to the services which use them. 
Of course, subscribing to several servi£es would probably in-
volve greater financial expenditures than many people would be able to 
assume . In instances where the cost presented a problem, a feasible 
course of action would be to obtain access at libraries, brokerage 
houses, etc. to as many of the services as possible. Such a procedure 
should permit most of the services to be followed at no cost. 
13. 
For comparative purposes, we will discuss the record of one 
15 
of the leading (from a circulation standpoint) bulletin services on 
both the market and individual issues. It is impossible to directly 
compare the record of any of the leading fundamental services with the 
predictions of the technical services. X Service is being used because 
it provides us with the best basis for comparison. 
We will see how t he records of X Service, Magee, and In-
vestors Research on specific stocks compare with the action of t he Dow. 
In the case of the market as a whole, we will derive a general idea of 
whether X Service has done a better forecasting job than the technical 
publications. 
The conclusion which will be reached is that, on the ,.;hole, 
the technical services made a more satisfactory showing both in select-
ing specific stocks and in forecasting general market action. Con-
sequently, we must answer yes to the question of whether technical 
systems should be given primary emphasis when planning an investment 
program. 
15. 
This service will be referred to henceforth as X Service. Its 
position on both individual securities and the market is based 
primarily on fundamentals, and it is regarded as a "fundamental;' 
service. 
14. 
SECTION I 
DAR VAS: FEELING TOWARD TECHNICAL SYSTEMS 
In this chapter, we will show what one man - - Mr . Nicholas 
Darvas - - was able to accomplish with a sound technical approach. Un-
fortunately, few people are likely to achieve the amount of success ex-
perienced by Mr. Darvas . HoHever, his experiences provides us with a 
concrete example of how technical systems can be used to tremendous 
financial advantage . Also in this chapter, we will obtain an idea of 
the prevalent feeling toward technical methods . 
DARVAS 1 S ACCOMPLISHMENTS: SOUNDNESS OF HIS APPROACH 
16 
Probably the most successful book from a sales standpoint 
ever written on investments relates the true story of the market acti -
vities of a professional dancer, Mr. Nicholas Darvas. Starting with 
a relatively small sum of less than $50, 000, Mr . Darvas accumulated a 
profit of $2 million within a few years. After several initial failures, 
Darvas developed the system which was to gain him his fortune . 
Basic Principles 
His basic principles were extremely simple. 
17 
Firstly , he 
kept his losses small by placing stop loss orders beneath all his hold -
16. 
17. 
Nicholas Darvas, How I Made $2, 000, 000 in t he Stock Market (Larchmont, 
New York: American Research Institute, 1960). 
These are orders to sell a stock if it declines to a predetermined 
price. For example, for a stock selling at 50 a stop loss order 
might be placed at 45. If the issue declined to that level, the 
stop loss order would then become a market order and the stock would 
be eold at he best possible price. 
15. 
ings. Secondly, as long as a stock performed well it was retained. 
Thirdly, selections were made on the basis of strong market action 
19 
18 
accompanied by increasing volume. Fourthly, holdings were concentrated 
in listed stocks for which there was a ready market. 
Lastly, small initial purchases were made in issue s which 
looked attractive . If the stock continued to act well, the holding 
was enlarged, in some instances to the point where many investment 
people would have considered it way out of proportion in relation to the 
size of the total portfolio. These five principles were followed con-
scientiously except in the case of E. L. Bruce. 
Major Successes 
Most of the $295,000 Darvas made in E. L. Bruce was obtained 
subsequent to the issues being removed from trading on the American 
Stock Exchange. The stock was then traded only in the over-the-counter 
market . When trading in Bruce was suspended on the ASE, Darvas was 
faced with the necessity of abandoning one of his principles. He either 
had to continue to hold a stock no longer listed on an exchange or sell 
an issue while it was acting extremely well. As has been indicated, 
his decision was to continue to hold. 
In addition to E.L. Bruce, Darvas had major successes with 
four stocks -- Lorillard, Diners' Club, Universal Controls, and Thiokol. 
18. 
19 . 
A price decline of 10% or more was generally considered by Darvas to 
mean that a stock was no longer acting well and should be sold. 
In other words, Darvas purchased only issues whose price was trending 
upward and which were becoming increasingly active. 
16. 
More than 95% of the $2 million was made in these five situations . 
Now, let us consider for a moment the soundness of the policies followed 
by Darvas which enabled him to achieve these successes . 
Soundness of His Principles 
Certainly, no one can question the wisdom of an investor 
limiting his losses while letting his profits grow. Also, since 
Darvas often concentrated heavily in certain situations, it made good 
sense for him to buy only stocks in which there was a sufficiently active 
market, so that he would not encounter problems in disposing of his 
holdings . 
Based on his personal experiences, the author believes there 
is a definite tendency to watch the market performance of an issue more 
closely if it is owned than if it is not . Consequently, the idea of 
making a small initial investment in a stock seems sound . However, 
the author has found thvt in the company where he works there is a 
general feeling that eound policy dictates having no more than 10% of 
one's account in any single issue. 
Naturally the less the degree of diversification in a portfolio, 
the greater is the risk and, also, the greater is the potential profit . 
Both the proponents and opponents of policies of diversification and 
concentration are able to muster a strong argument for their position. 
Which type of a policy should be followed would seem to depend largely 
17. 
on the individual involved and the degree of risk he is willing to accept . 
However, if it is sound policy for one person to emphasize 
price action and volume when determining his position on individual 
More than 95% of the $2 million was made in these five situations . 
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on the individual involved and the degree of risk he is willing to 
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However, if it is sound policy for one person to emphasize 
price action and volume when determining his position on individual 
17. 
stocks, it should be equally sound for another . If one accepts the 
technician's basic premise that new developments are reflected in an 
issue's price action before they are known to the general public, the 
soundness of attaching primary importance to price movements becomes 
apparent. 
The soundness of attaching importance to volume as well as 
price action is not readily apparent. However, a breakout from a 
trading range accompanied by high volume is generally much more signi-
ficant than a low volume breakout . 
20 
In the latter instance the rise 
21 
may very well be due to a "vacuum" in the floor trader's book. 
What often happens next is that offerings pour in and the stock turns 
sharply downward. On the other hand, when a breakout occurs on high 
volume, the odds are in favor of further gains of significant size 
22 
being recorded . 
We have now analyzed the five basic principles followed by 
Darvas. There seems no question that his over-all method was a sound 
one. It is true, of course, that much of his s uccess was due to his 
heavy concentration in certain issues. This procedure was well suited 
to Darvas' temperament and was a sound one for him to follow. However, 
there are many people who should follow a policy of maintaining adequate 
20. 
21. 
22 . 
The word "vacuum" in this instance refers to a lack of sell orders. 
If we had been talking about a decline instead of a rise it would 
have referred to a lack of buy orders. 
A floor trader is the person responsible for maintaining an orderly 
market in a stock. 
Edwin S. Quinn, Nimble Speculator . (Barron's, October 10, 1960). 
18. 
23 
diversification in their account. 
FUNDAMENTALS STILL GIVEN PRIMARY EMPHASIS BY MOST INVESTORS 
Because of the success experienced by Mr. Darvas and the 
excellent records achieved by services such as Drew's Odd Lot Studies, 
Harding Index, and the Bank Credit Analyst, interest in technical 
systems has increased substantially during recent years. However, 
interviews with 36 people in Boston who do investment work have led the 
author to believe that the vast majority of investors still place pri-
mary emphasis on fundamentals in their investment planning. 
People who closely follow the market, such as those whom the 
author interviewed, would naturally be the ones who place the greatest 
amount of emphasis on technical approaches. As is mentioned in the 
introduction, technical systems are of no use to those who do not 
attempt to capitalize on minor or intermediate moves by the market and 
individual issues. 
Answers Obtained 
In the interviews, two basic questions were asked . Firstly, 
we obtained the percentage weight attached to fundamentals and to tech-
nical factors in the formation of views ~oncerning the outlook for in-
dividual issues. Secondly, similar percentages were obtained concern-
ing the outlook for the market as a whole as measured by any of the 
leading stock averages such as Dhe Dow. The percentages given are shown 
in Table I on the following page . Two of the 36 people interviewed 
23 . 
By adequate diversification we mean having no more than 10% of the 
account in any one security. 
20. 
21. 
TABLE I 
PERCENTAGE IMPORTANCE ATTACHED TO FUNDAMENTALS 
AND TO TECHNICAL SYSTEMS 
Technical Fundamental Technical Fundamental 
Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage 
People Interviewed On Market On Market On Stocks On Stocks 
One 75% 25% 60% 40% 
Two 65 35 50 50 
Three 60 40 50 50 
Four 50 50 50 50 
Five so so 50 50 
Six 50 50 50 50 
Seven 50 50 45 55 
Eight so 50 40 60 
Nine 40 60 40 60 
Ten 40 60 35 65 
Eleven 35 65 35 65 
Twelve 35 65 33 1/3 66 2/3 
Thirteen 33 1/3 66 2/3 33 1/3 66 2/3 
Fourteen 30 70 30 70 
Fifteen 25 75 30 70 
Sixteen 25 75 30 70 
Seventeen 25 75 25 75 
Eighteen 25 75 25 75 
Nineteen 20 80 25 75 
Twenty 20 80 25 75 
Twenty One 20 80 20 80 
Twenty Two 15 85 20 80 
Twenty Three 15 85 15 85 
Twenty Four 10 90 10 90 
Twenty Five 10 90 10 90 
Twenty Six 10 90 10 90 
Twenty Seven 10 90 10 90 
Twenty Eight 10 90 10 90 
Twenty Nine 10 90 5 95 
Thirty 5 95 5 95 
Thirty One 5 95 5 95 
Thirty Two 1 99 5 95 
Thirty Three 0 100 5 95 
Thirty Four 0 100 5 95 
Thirty Five 0 100 
Thirty Six 0 100 
said that they paid no attention to the action of the market . 
As one can see, only four of the 70 pairs of percentages in-
dicate that primary emphasis was given to technical systems. In ten 
other instances, technical and fundamental factors were considered of 
equal importance . Chief emphasis was attached to fundamentals in the 
case of 56 of the 70 pairs . 
Understanding of Technical Methods 
After obtaining the two pairs of percentages from each person 
interviewed, the author attempted to learn the amount of understanding 
of t echnical me thods which each individual possessed . The author asked 
all of the people interviewed questions concerning the technical methods 
covered in this paper. 
By asking these questions, it was possible to determine whether 
a correlation existed between the degree of understanding of technical 
systems and the percentages the systems received. In general, the 
author found that the greater the understanding of technical method9, 
the greater the importance which was likely to be attached to them. 
There seems to be no reason to believe that the people inter-
viewed are not representative of those in the investment field . As sum-
ing that they are typical, it is apparent that even among those who are 
doing investment work, very few have taken the time to make a thorough 
study of technical systems. 
Conclusions 
Up to now, we have shown that successful use of a sound tech-
nical approach can bring fantastic profits - $2 million in the instance 
22. 
discussed. Also, we have indicated that apparently few people have an 
understanding of the merits of technical systems. It is probably 
because of this lack of understanding that most people do not give tech-
nical m~thods primary emphasis in their investment planning. 
23. 
SECTION II 
SYSTEMS CONCERNED HITH PSYCHOLOGY 
The first thing which an investor has to decide is the dir-
ection in which the market is likely to move. Naturally, if he feels 
the basic trend of the market seems likely to be upward over the next 
few months, he will follow a sharply different policy regarding indivi-
dual issues than if the basic trend seems likely to be downward. In 
this chapter, we will consider two methods used to forecast future 
market action which are concerned with measuring mass psychology 
Drew's Odd Lot Studies and Neill's Letters of Contrary Opinion. 
In the case of the former method, we will be able t o show 
precisely the results which were achieved during 1956-60. Probably 
the primary usefulness of Neill's Letters of Contrary Opinion is in 
preventing one from being carried along with the crowd when ther e is 
almost universal a greement concerning the direction in which the mar-
ket is likely to move. 
To help us determine if the market ac ted contrary to "every-
one's" expectations during 1956-60, Table II on page39 will prove use-
ful . When considering Neill, we will be primarily interested in 
determining the degree of success which he experienced in calling the 
three intermediate changes in trend recorded by the market during 1956-
60. 
24. 
IMPORTANCE WHICH PSYCHOLOGY CAN PLAY 
As we will show, Drew and Neill both had excellent records 
during the five years ending with 1960. This is not surprising to 
the author considering the importance which changes in investor psycho-
logy have on stock prices . 
Drew conunents in his book that ' 'every successful speculator 
and every student of psychology knows that the mass of people are less 
24 
intelligent than the few . " 
25 
As there are approximately 15 million 
shareholders, it is reasonable to assume that they are representative 
of the public as a whole. Consequently, it follows that the mass of 
investors is likely to be wrong at important turning points in the 
market. Drew points out that 'rin order that a few may be right, the 
26 
many must be wrong. " 
How Neill Capitalizes on Public Psychology 
The forecasting methods developed by Neill and Drew are both 
based on the assumption that most investors are likely to be wrong on 
important occasions . By reading numerous financial publications and 
corresponding with different individuals in the investment field, Neill 
obtains a feel for the prevalent market outlook. Neill's basic premise 
is that whenever "everyone" seems to hold the same view, the market is 
soon likely to move in the opposite direction. 
24. 
Drew, op. cit. p. 169, 170. 
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United Business Service, June 5, 1961, p. 228. 
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Drew, op. cit. p. 170. 
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How Drew Capitalizes on Public Psychology 
Drew points out in his book that the public is most bullish 
27 28 
around major tops such as those in 1929, 1937, and 1946, which is shown 
29 
by monthly odd lot data. In addition, the public is most bearish at 
low points in the market. Drew considers that the figures which are 
published daily on odd lot trading give an accurate picture of what 
the "public" is doing. Drew's basic premise is that odd lotters will 
show an increasing tendency to buy before a downturn in the market and 
an increasing tendency to sell before an upturn. 
Few books have ever been written which illustrate more clearly 
the wisdom of acting contrary to the crowd than does Mackay's Memoirs 
of Popular Delusions and the Madness of Crowds. In this book, there 
are several illustrations in which crowds manifest investment fo lly. 
Tulip Rage 
In the author's opinion, the most interesting of these illu-
strations is the story of the tulip rage which occurred in Holland in 
the 1630's . By 1634, people in that country were so anxious to own 
tulips that all ordinary industry was neglect~d and virtually the entire 
population was engaged in the tulip trade. 
In 1635 many people were known to invest a fortune of 100,000 
florins in the purchase of 40 roots. During 1636, regular markets for 
27. 
A major top is a high point reached by the market immediately. pre-
ceding a decline of significant proportions - probably 15% or more. 
28 . 
Drew, op. cit., p. 170 
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Odd lotters are those who buy or sell stocks in less than 100 share lots. 
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Charles L.L. D. Mackay, Extraordinary Popular Delusions and the Madness 
of Crowds. (Boston, L.C. Page reprint 1932). 
the purchase and sale of tulips were established on the Stock Exchange 
of Amsterdam. Such markets were also set up in Rotterdam, Harlaem, 
Leyden, Alkna, Hoorn, and other towns. 
common. 
Gambling in bulbs became quite 
Everyone seemed to believe that the passion for tulips would 
last indefinitely. However, many people finally realized that prices 
could not climb forever and that sizeable losses had to be experienced 
eventually. As this conviction spread, the price of tulips fell, and 
never again reached a comparable level. Within an extremely short 
time, people could not dispose of tulips for even one tenth of their 
purchase price. Many who had briefly emerged from the humbler walks 
of life were thrown back into their original obscurity. Wealthy mer-
chants were reduced almost to beggary, while many a represantative of a 
noble line saw the fortunes of his house completely vanish . Of course, 
those who sold their bulbs before the bubble burst made fantastic profits. 
Emotions Often Rule Stock Market 
On several occasions during the current century, there have 
been stock market developments closely comparable to what happened to 
the price of tulips in the 1630's in Holland . A study of the price 
action of the Dow over the past sixty years indicates that the public 
has bean carried to extremes of optimism and pessimism in its evaluation 
of stocks . 
For example, in July of 1923 the Dow was as low as 86 .91. 
By September of 1929 it reached 381. 27 . A sharp decline then began, 
carrying the Dow to 41.22 in July of 1932. In other words, between 
27. 
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the low in 1923 and the peak in 1929 there was a rise of well over 300%, 
followed by a decline of nearly 90%. In retrospect, it is apparent 
that stocks were irrationally high in 1927 at around the 200 level . 
However, in less than two years the Dow rose nearly 100%. Similarly, 
stocks were irrationally low in 1931 but this did not prevent them from 
selling shortly thereafter at one-third their average price of that year. 
It is apparent that the level of the market at any given time 
is heavily dependent on the psychology of investors. Now, let us take 
a look at the records of Drew and Neill to determine their success in 
predicting market action through the use of systems which are based on 
studies of public psychology. 
METHOD USED BY DREW 
Garfield Drew believes that changes in the market sentiment 
of the public and of professional traders can often be measured with 
31 
" reasonable accuraci' through the figures released by the Securities 
and Exchange Commission on odd lot trading and the operations of New 
York Stock Exchange members . His studies are based solely on odd lot 
figures which are available sooner than from member figures and vir-
tually always show just the opposite tendencies. 
Public Hard to Convince 
According to Drew, people are slow to believe that any new 
trend \'lill continue for long. They therefore buy and sell accordingly. 
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Drew, op . cit . , p . 193. 
However, once a new trend has lasted for a lengthy period, they finally 
become convinced that it will continue. After the trend has reversed 
itself, they are slow in changing their opinion. Because of this slow-
ness to change, the public buys heavily at the end of a bull market and 
buys even more in the early stages of a bear market. Conversely, sell-
ing by the public tends to increase at the end of a bear market. 
Drew claims that the stockholder lists of large concerns con-
firm the fact that the small investor buys and sells too soon, even 
though he tends to buy on weakness and sell on st~ength. The number of 
shareholders of large firms shows a propensity to increase in a declin-
ing market, and decrease during the next advance. A change of senti-
ment on the part of the public after any market trend has become well 
established is almost always wrong. 
Professionals Versus The Public 
Activity of odd letters is considered by Drew to be repres-
entative of what the "public" is doing while trading by New York Stock 
Exchange members is considered representative of "professional" activity. 
Dow classifies as the "public," board room sitters, businessmen, specu-
lators and all other amateurs who try to "beat the game,u as well as 
uninformed self-styled "investors." Classified as "professionals" by 
Drew are important bankers, large corporate executives, Stock Exchange 
members, professional operators, successful speculators, and investors 
who deal correctly with the major trend. 
The contest is waged mainly by those who depend on security 
trading for a living and amateurs. The professional hopes to sell his 
29. 
merchandise to the latter group. Consequently, it is not surprising 
that member trading, which accounts for approximately one-half of pro-
fessional operations, shows a tendency to move conversely to odd lot 
trading, which represents approximately one-fourth of the publ ic' s deal-
ings. 
Balance Index 
Data on daily odd lot sales and purchases qave been available 
32 
since March of 1936 and on daily odd lot short sales since June of 1930. 
The principal tool which Drew uses in forecasting stock market action is 
the Balance Index. This Index is a ten day moving average of odd lot 
sales divided by purchases . 
For example, the odd lot figures for a particular day mi ght 
show that 500,000 shares of stock were purchased and 400,000 shares 
were sold . Consequently, the ratio for that day would be 0 . 80 (400,000 
~ 500,000) . Ratios for ten consecutive days are derived in the same 
way and are averaged to provide the " Balance Index. " 
Drew keeps a chart showing the movement of the Balance Index 
and the Dow. He watches for a divergence between the two lines. In 
other words, if the Balance Index line and the Dow are both rising or 
falling, the market's current trend is considered likely to continue. 
The public would be exhibiting its normal tendency to sell on advances 
and buy on declines . However, if the Balance Index and t he Dow should 
32 . 
A short sale is made in anticipation of a stock's declining in price 
thus making it possible to purchase it later at a lower level . In 
other words, stock is sold which is not owned. Naturally , it is 
necessary to purchase it subsequently. This is known as ·•covering" 
the short sale. 
30. 
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begin to move in opposite directions, a reversal of the market's present 
trend would be expected shortly. 
To give a valid "buy" signal the Balance Index and the Dow 
should diverge for at least six days and possibly as many as twelve, 
depending upon the sharpness of the movements by the market and the Index. 
Drew's studies have convinced him that if the Dow is dropping sharply and 
the Index is rising sharply, only six days of divergence are needed for 
a valid "buy11 signal. On the other hand, if the Dow and Index are 
showing only gradual trends, twelve days should be allowed. 
In the case of market tops, the time element is never as short 
as six days and the period of divergence normally should be between ten 
and fifteen days. The longer time period required than in the case of 
"buyrr signals is because neither the Balance Index nor the Dow is likely 
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to show as sharp a trend at market tops as bottoms. 
It should be pointed out that it is the trend of the Balance 
Index, and not the level at which it appears, which is important. For 
example, when the Balance Index line declines during a market advance, 
this means that the odd lot public is becoming more bullish which is a 
bearish market indication. The Index may be declining because purchases 
are exceeding sales by an increasing margin, or because sales are exceed-
ing purchases by a decreasing margin. 
Short-Sales Index 
While primary importance is always attached to the Balance 
Index, Drew also attaches some significance to an index derived by dividing 
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Drew, op . cit., p . 229. 
the number of shares sold short in odd lots each day by all odd lot 
sales. For exampl~ , if the odd letters sold 500,000 shares on a 
given date and sold 2,000 shares short, the Short Sales Ratio would be 
.4% (2,000 ~ 500,000). lVhile a ten day moving average is used for the 
Balance Index, a five day moving average is used in this case and is 
called the Short-Sales Index, 
Drew has studi ed shor t sales figure s for a l engt hy period 
and has concluded that the odd lot short seller generally does an even 
poorer job of forecasting market action than the average odd lot trader. 
The normal tendency of the Short-Sales Index is to increase on declines 
and decrease on rallies. In other words, odd lot short selling tends 
to reach its maximum around low points and its minimum at market tops . 
Volume Index 
Another odd lot tool which is used by Drew is the Volume Index, 
34 
obtained by dividing total daily volume into odd lot volume. To make 
the fluctuations less violent, a five day moving average is computed. 
Total odd lot volume is obtained by adding together the purchases and 
32. 
sales made on any_given date by those trading in less than 100 share lots . 
The result is divided by twice the reported total volume of trading, 
because for every purchase there must be a sale. The reported fi gures 
of total volume represent sales only. 
For example, if there were 5 million shares traded during a 
day, this fi gure would be doubled to give total volume. Let us assume 
34. 
Total daily volume is the number of shares of stock sold on the New 
York Stock Exchange on any given day. 
that odd lot sales totalled 500,000 shares. Dividing 500,000 by 
10,000,000 gives us the volume rat io which in this instance is 5%. 
The average of similar ratios for five consecu t ive days would be the 
"Volume Index." 
This index is normally high around market bottoms and low 
around tops which seems surprising on the surface. Since the odd lot 
publ ic is usually wrong in its market activities at important occasions, 
we would expect its interest in stocks to be greater at tops than at 
bottoms . There are two main reasons why the Volume Index indicates 
the opposi t e to be true. 
Firstly, Drew believes that as the market advances odd lot 
traders tend to become more confident and thus concentrate their buying 
increasingly in lower priced issues in which they are able to trade in 
round lots . Secondly, Drew feels that as the market declines the odd 
lot group is temporarily increased by bargain hunters . 
As has been indicated, the figures on odd lot volume show a 
tendency on the part of the public to be come relatively more active 
around market bottoms and relatively less active around tops. A 
decline in the Volume Index while the Dow is rising is considered by 
Drew to be a bearish market indication. 
ing a market drop is considered bullish. 
An advance in the Index dur-
DREW'S KECORD 1956- 60 
Now that we have described how Drew forms his market opinions, 
33. 
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let us take a look at his record during the years 1956-60. 
Positions Taken in 1956 
In the January 26, 1956 report, Drew pointed out that the mar-
36 
ket had reached a minor oversold position early in the preceding week 
which, of course, implied that purchases could be made for at least a 
short term upward move. On April 5, this position was changed . The 
report of that date stated that there was increasing evidence that most 
of the advance was about over and that a trader might sell . 
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The following telegram was sent to wire service subscribers 
on May 28: " On basis Friday's odd lot figures and other evidence now 
of temporarily oversold position believe decline cleaned up. For worth-
while rally advise .. . . 1 The next change took place on August 11 when 
Drew reported that a market top was probably being formed and that a 
38 
"fairly substantial" decline could follow. 
35 . 
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Drew publishes a weekly service in which his market position is fully 
discussed and we shall judge his market forecasting accuracy by the 
positions taken by that service. 
Drew meant that the market had reached a lower level than seemed 
warranted by current circumstances. 
For a small extra charge subscribers to the weekly bulletin can 
receive notification of a change in position by telegram whenever 
there appears to be urgency to make sending of wires advisable . 
Garfield A. Drew. Drew Odd Lot Studies . (Drew Investment Associates, 
Boston: August 11, 1956), p. 11. 
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On November 29, wire service subscribers received the follow-
ing telegram: "Odd lot studies indicate decline since August has cul-
minated. Expect recovery into January. Would split buying between 
stocks that have been hammered down . .. • and stocks that have stood out 
against the trend .••• ' Drew then remained bullish until January 19, 
1957 . 
Excellent Results in 1956 
Probably the outstanding feature of Drew's record in 1956 is 
the fact that on the two occasions he sent telegrams to subscribers, he 
caught the exact bottom of intermediate declines . In addition, the 
two sell advices were almost perfectly timed. As Table III on page40 
shows, subscribers who bought every time Drew got a buy signal in 1956 
and sold short every time he became bearish, had a net advantage for 
the year of 207 . 67 Dow points. Drew's record for 1956 is truly amazing 
considering that the Dow finished 1956 within 2% of its level at the beginn-
ing of the year as can be seen from Chart I on page 50 . A glance at 
Table III on page40 and then at Chart I, should leave one impressed 
with Drew's record for that year. 
Positions Taken in 1957 
On January 29, 1957 Drew indicated that he was concerned by 
39 
the Dow's downside breakout from a trading range and advised at least 
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50% liquidity . Then, on Februaby 12 wires were sent reading: "Indexes 
39. 
A downside breakout means that the market has declined below the 
bottom level of a range in which it has traded for several weeks. 
40. 
By 50% liquidity Drew meant that half of one's account should be 
in cash or short term bonds and no more than 50% in common stock. 
show oversold condition, cover shorts . Buy for rally . .•. " 
Drew now remained bullish until August 3. He then stated 
that the Dow appeared headed irregularly lower, and a 50% liquid 
position was advised. The following week he was even more bearish. 
Some possible short sales were suggested and the intermediate market 
trend was indicated to be definitely down. 
On September 11, 1957 wires were again sent and this time read 
as follows: 11 Indexes indicate buying point. Cover all shorts. For 
buys, refer page 4, August 31 R.eport. " On September 23, this position 
was reversed - - twelve short sales were suggested and elimination of 
all long positions was indicated to be desirable . 
The next change in position was on November 20 when the 
following telegram was sent: ' Indexes indicate intermediate uptrend . 
Cover shorts . Suggested purchases ..•. " On December 16, Drew took 
41 
the position that new lows would be seen " sooner or later , " and that 
all stocks should be sold. 
R.esults in 1957 
As Table III on page 40 shows, Drew obtained four sell sig-
nals and three buy signals in 1957. The net advantage of the various 
positions taken was 178 . 23 Dow points. Once again an excellent show-
ing was made. We can see from Chart I on page 50 that the Dow declined 
more than 5% during the year. 
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Recommendations and Record in 1958 
Drew was becoming more bullish by late February of 1958. 
He covered all his short positions except one on February 27. On 
March 13, he established several long positions. This bullish posi -
tion was reversed in the April 5 repor t. 
A change was next seen on May 24 when a moderately bullish 
near-term position was taken. The following wire was sent on July 9: 
"Continued shift to heavier odd lot buying indicates market at or 
close to intermediate top . Except for Richfield, sell remaining rec-
ommended long positions. On the other side, regard following as 
good sale s • •.. " 
Just ten days later Drew completely reversed himself; covered 
all short sales, and established numerous long positions. From Dec-
ember 27, 1957 until July 19, 1958 Drew did not make much money for his 
clients as his advices show a net advantage for that period of only 
6. 24 Dow points . 
Bullish Most of 1959 , Bearish Most of 1960 
However, Drew remained bullish from July 19, 1958 until Sep-
tember 3, 1959 . Consequently, he caught nearly all of the 1958- 59 
r ise which, as we can see from Chart I on page 50 was extremely sharp . 
For more than 15 months following the September 3, 1959 sell 
signal , Drew remained bearish. Finally, on December 10, 1960 he began 
to swing over to the bullish side. In the report of that date, he ad-
vised subscribers that during the following month the market was likely 
to move upward from its present level of 604.16 . During the remainder 
37. 
of 1960 he became increasingly bullish. 
Two Ways of Figuring the Record 
A person who followed Drew conscientiously from 1956 through 
1960 would have bought on ten different occasions and sold on nine. 
The net advantage in terms of the Dow between the time of the first buy 
signal and the tenth would have been 653 . 72 points as Table III on page 
40 indicates. 
At the start of 1956 the Dm.;r was around 485. It stood at 
approximately 615 at the conclusion of 1960. The goal of the invest-
38. 
ment advisers at the company where the author works is to have the accounts 
under their supervision perform as '""ell as the Dow. Achievement of 
such results seems to be a generally accepted criterion of satisfactory 
performance . Consequently, Drew's performance ,.;ras excellent, because 
he was able to show a net advantage of 653. 72 points during a period 
'""hen the Dow advanced 130 points . 
Naturally, to obtain the full net advantage of 653 . 72 points, 
it would have been necessary for the investor not only to buy at the 
time of the buy signals but also to sell short at the time of the sell 
signals. IVhen several of the sell signals were recorded Drew was not 
sufficiently bearish to lead one to believe that short selling was ad-
visable. It is possible to make a fairly strong argument that in ev-
aluating Drew's record only the ~hanges between t he various b~y and 
sell signals should be considered . From Table II on page 39 '""e can 
see that fi guring the r ecord from buy signal to sell signal there is a net 
advantage of 369 . 69 points which is a favorable showing considering 
39. 
TABLE II 
DKEW'S RECORD 1956-60: FROM 
iUY SIGNAL TO SELL SIGNAL* 
Level of Dow Level of Dow 
Date of Date of Time of Time of 
Bux Signal Sell Signal Bux Signal Sell Signal Advantage Disadvantage 
1/26/56 4/5/56 468. 50 518 . 88 50. 38 
5/28/56 8/ll/56 468 . 61 520 . 19 51.38 
11/29/56 1/19/57 464.25 484.00 19.75 
2/12/57 8/3/57 456.47 507.34 50.87 
9/ll/57 9/23/57 471.20 470.75 0 . 45 
ll/20/57 12/16/57 431.27 436 . 18 4 . 91 
3/3/58 4/5/58 438.66 443.68 5.02 
5/24/58 7/9/58 460.15 480 .56 20.41 
7/9/58 9/3/59 482 . 80 650.22 167.42 
370.14 0.45 
Neb Advantage 369.69 points 
*Garfield A. Drew, Drew Odd Lot Studies Boston,(Drew Investment Associates, 
1956- 60) 
TABLE III 
DREW'S RECORD 1956-60 
FROM SIGNAL TO SIGNAL* 
Date of Date of Level of 
Buy Signal Sell Signal Dow 
1/26/56 468.50 
4/5/56 518.88 
5/28/56 468 . 81 
8/11/56 520.19 
11/29/56 464. 25 
1/19/57 484. 00 
2/12/57 456.47 
8/3/57 507 . 34 
9/11/57 471.20 
9/23/57 470.15 
11/20/57 431.27 
12/26/57 436.18 
3/3/58 438 . 66 
4/5/58 443.68 
5/24/58 460. 15 
7/9 I 58 480.56 
7/19/58 482 . 80 
9/3/59 650.22 
12/10/60 604.16 
Advantage 
from Preceding 
Signal 
50.38 
50.07 
51.38 
55.94 
19.75 
27 . 53 
50. 87 
36.14 
39 . 48 
4.91 
5. 02 
20. 41 
167. 42 
46.06 
675 . 36 
Disadvantage 
from Preceding 
Signal 
0 . 45 
2.48 
16.47 
2. 24 
21 . 64 
Net Advantage 653 . 72 points 
40. 
* Garfield A. Drew, Drew Odd Lot Studies ( ios ton, Drew Investment Associates, 
1956- 60). 
that the Dow rose 130 points. 
Around 155 points would probably have bean absorbed by the 
42 
commissions on the purchases and sales. Deducting 155 from 370 
leaves 215 points which is still 85 points more than the advance rec-
orded by the Dow during 1956-60. Consequently, based on Drew's rec-
ord during those five years, the author concludes that Drew has dev-
eloped an effective method for capitalizing on changes in public psycho-
logy . 
NEILL LETTERS OF CONTRARY OPINION 
Now let us consider another service -- Neill Letters of Con-
trary Opinion which advises its readers to act contrary to the 
" crowd11 • As we have seen, the basic premise of Drew is that sound 
policy dictates acting contrary to the public at turning points in the 
market. Neill's basic premise is exactly the same. However, Drew 
and Neill have different methods of determining mass psychology. Neill 
pays as much attention to groups such as bankers, investment advisors, 
and financial writers as he does to the odd lotters. In other words, 
Neill attempts to find out the thinking of people in general concerning 
the market. 
Neill does not run an advisory service and only a relatively 
41.. 
small part of the "Letters" are devoted to market comments . The primary 
42. 
The average commission charged for the sale of a New York Stock 
Exchange stock '"~ould be around 1 ~% of the sale price. Multiply-
ing 1~% by the 19 times Drew got either a buy or a sell signal 
gives us 28~% . If we assume that the average price of the Dow 
during 1956- 60 was 550 and multiply this figure by 28~% , we get 
156.75. 
purpose of the "Letters" is to offer contrary opinions on generally 
held economic views. However , the reader is kept up-to-date on Neill's 
thinking regarding the outlook for the stock market. 
Agreement iy Public Reason for Skepticism 
In his book, Drew cites numerous examples of times when every-
one expected the market to move in a certain direction and were 100% 
43 
wrong as it did just the opposite. He then goes on to say: "During 
the great er part of the time, it is impossible to apply the theory of 
'Contrary Opinion" because the necessary circumstances do not exist . 
When they do, however , the validity of the theory has always been proved . 
Drew meant that normally there is not an unanimity of opinion regarding 
the outlook for the market but that whenever there is stock prices 
will move in the direction not expected. 
Why "Everyone" May Be Wrong 
Let us consider for a moment why security prices might move 
contrary to general expectations at important times. The buying and 
selling of stocks by human beings makes nprice trends . Therefore, if 
the market moves up when a decl.ine is expected, it is apparent that 
not "everyone" acted on that particular belief but instead did just the 
opposite. 
The reader may remember the reference earlier in this chapter 
to the contest between the amateurs and the professionals. 
43. 
Drew, op. cit., pp . 175-187 
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Ibid . , p. 187. 
Naturally, 
42. 
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to make a livelihood, the professionals must act differently from the 
public. In other words, to make money the professionals must sell to 
and buy from the public at the right time. The public outnumbers the 
professionals by a wide margin. However, the l a tter generally exert 
a considerably greater influence on the market , as they devote all of 
their available funds and most of their time to influencing stock prices. 
Let us assume that 11 everyone11 is bearish. Consequently, 
their selling has been completed and they are waiting for lower prices . 
Faced with such a situation what are the professionals to do? They 
cannot sell for no one would buy from them in any appreciable volume. 
The only course open to the professionals is to buy stocks. These 
purchases are made in the expectation that the public will be drawn 
back into the market once the price trend indicates that their bear -
ishness was wrong. In other words, if 11 everyone11 has either sold or 
bought in anticipation of stock prices moving in a certain direction, 
it is to the professionals benefit to have the market act contrary to 
expectations. 
USE OF CONTRARY OPINION - - A LOOK AT THE RECORD 
From Char t I on page 50 , we can see that the basic trend of 
the market changed directions three times during 1956-60. During 1956 
and 19 57 the market made a 11 triple top11 around the 520 level. Con-
sequent ly, the first change in the trend of the market during 1956 -60 
could be said to have occurred either in April of 1956 or in July of 
1957 . The Dow was around 520 at both times and fluctuated within a 
relatively narrow range during the interim. 
43 . 
The second change in trend occurred in December of 1957. Many 
people feel that the third change took place in August of 1959 even 
though the Dow did not make its high until early in January of the 
following year . The reason for this feeling is that most stocks 
made their high for that particular upward move in the summer of 1959 . 
If the theory of contrary opinion has merit, we would expect 
to find that Neill did a good job predicting these three changes in 
trend . To see how accurate Neill's market forecasts were, let us 
now look at his record during the five years ending with 1960. 
iearish During Most of 1956 and 1957 
At the start of 1956, Neill was looking for a market down-
trend, but it was not until April 25 that his writings on the market 
began to be definitely bearish. Consequently, there is justification 
for saying that Neill called the first change in trend during 1956 -60 
right to the exact month. 
There was then no change in his position for several months 
45 
-- until January 30, 1957. He then turned neutral near term but re-
mained bearish on the longer-range outlook remarking that: "As num-
erous stock market analysts are either bearish or inclined to cautious-
ness at the present time, it would not be surprising if some time 
elapsed before the market hits the tobaggan. In sum, at the moment 
it appears to be a case of a bullish public and a bearishly inclined 
advisory group -- which is not commonly found just before a severe 
45. 
In other woDds, Neill felt that over the near term the market 
was as likely to move up as down and vice versa. 
44. 
break in the market. Further uncertain and false moves may be in store 
46 
for us, therefore. ' ' 
By late February Neill was again strongly bearish and thus 
was forced to make the following comment on May 8: 11The late upsurge 
in the stock market makes my Contrary Opinions look silly. It is evi-
dent I misread sentiment in February and March. Far more bearish feel-
ing around then than I recognized. 
47 
It is fortunate I am not an advisor 
or my name would be mud . 11 However, Neill did not turn bullish and 
continued to look for an important top. 
The middle of July of 1957 was a time whan everyone seemed 
to share the same opinion. On July 17 Neill wrote as follows. 11 There 
is now NO QUESTION concerning Contrary Opinions . The odds have widened 
until opinions are virtually universal that -- (a) There will not be 
(cannot be) anf recession worthy of the name, that, indeed this autumn 
will bring another upward swing in the boom (b) The stock market may 
dip off a bit or 'consolidate its gains'" •••• thereafter to be followed 
also by a new upswing. The foregoing sums up the results of polls and 
surveys which were recently taken among prominent executives and bankers 
48 
around the nation." 
We have seen previously that Neill turned bearish the f i rst 
time the Dow made a top at 520. Now we find that the third time it 
46. 
Humphrey B. Neill, Neill Letters of Contrary Qpinion (Saxton River, 
Vermont, January 30, 1957) p. 4. 
47. 
Ibid, May 8, 1956, p. 1. 
48 . 
Ibid, July 17, 1957, p. 3. 
45. 
made a top at that level "everyone" was optimistic concerning the out-
look for stock prices which naturally meant that Neill was bearish. 
The July 31. 1957 letter was "on the fence." Except for 
that letter, Neill remained bearish until November 6, 1957 when he 
said that: ''The stock market has had its big dip for the year. One 
49 
contrarily might be quite cheerful. 11 Just the next month the market 
46. 
turned upward and from a level only slightly below the level on November 
6. 
Qptimistic During Most of 1958 and 1959 
On February 12, 1958 Neill wrote as follows: " As I have 
dared to remark contrarily ever since the October plunge, bearishness 
has simply been too "obvious" •..• Therefore, it might be prudent not to 
expect the stock market to keep on breaking records just because it did 
50 
so '~ell last month. " From then until May 7, 1958 Neill maintained 
an anti -bearish position. 
From May 7 until August 13 Neill did not appear to know 
exactly what position to take. During that time he seemed to vacillate 
between an anti-bearish and a cautious position. For over a year than 
-- from August 13, 1958 until September 9, 1959 -- N2ill was definitely 
bullish . On August 13, 1958 he pointed out that: ''One learns not to 
argue with mass movements; but rather recognizes the force of such 
51 
momentum. " Subsequent "Letters" contained equally bullish statements . 
49. 
Ibid, July 17, 1957, p. 3. 
50. 
Ibid, February 12, 1958, p. 1. 
51. 
Ibid, August 13, 1958, p. 4 
Finally, though, on September 9, 1959 Neill felt that bull -
ishness had become too prevalent and stated: "Recent information 
points to a degree of recklessness which can only be associated with 
52 
'top stages.''' If we agree with those who believe the market made a 
top in August, then we again find Neill missing t he peak by only one 
month. 
All letters then leaned in a bearish direction until December 
2, 1959. Neill then pointed out that a year -end rally was likely but 
that after New Year's it would probably be another story . Once the 
New Year got under way, the action of the market completely bore Neill 
out, as we can see from Chart I on page 50 . 
Rather Pessimistic During Most of 1960 
On February 10, 1960 Neill made these conunents: " .... Such a 
period of reappraisal (if I am correct in my assumptions) may last a 
year or longer .. .. the extent of t he fall is likely to be greater than 
47. 
now anticipated •.. it would be wishful thinking to count on the declines 
53 
being over. " A month later he suggested that now that the Dow theory 
had given a bearish confirmation former contrary opinions should be 
held at least until it was possible to see if businessmen were going to 
pull back . 
A shift in opinion took place on May 4 as demonstrated by 
the following statement. "Notwithstanding the lack of bullish stimu -
52 . 
Ibid, September 9, 1959, p. 2 
53. 
Ibid . , Februar y 10, 1960, p . 1. 
48. 
lation in either business or stock market indexes 
' 
it is getti ng past 
54 
the time to become bearish. However, this stand was abandoned in 
the very next letter and from then through the end of the year Neill 
was either "on the fencett or bearishly inclined. By the conclusion of 
the year, though, he appeared to be about ready to swing over to the 
bullish side . 
Over -All Record 
If ~ve analyze the record of Neill during 1956-60, we find 
that he turned definitely bearish on April 26, 1956. His market pos-
ition remained basically the same until November 6, 1957 when an anti-
bearish attitude was taken and maintained until August 13, 1958. 
Neill was then bullish until September 9, 1959 when he turned bearish. 
From then through the end of 1960, he continued to be inclined toward 
the bearish side . In other words, Neill did an almost perfect job 
calling the top in 1956 , the bottom in 1957, and the top in 1959 . 
Furthermore, he was bearish in July of 1957 and January of 1960, times 
when some people believedthere was a change in the basic trend of the 
market. 
Previously, we showed that even figuring only t he changes in 
the Dow between the various buy and sell signals and deducting commissions, 
Drew still outperformed the Dow by 85 points during 1956-60. We con-
eluded that he had made an excellent showing. Figuring Neill's record 
Drew's, we find that he shows an advantage of approx-in the same way as 
s... . 3 ~· · May 4, 1960, p. . 
imately 185 Dow points which is 30 less than the net advantage of Drew 
but 55 more than the advance turned in by the Dow. Neill's record is 
a creditable one. He not only outperformed the Dow but also called 
the three changes in the Dow's intermediate trend during 1956- 60 with 
considerable precision. 
Conclusion 
To sum up , Drew's 1956- 60 record strongly indicates tha t he 
has developed an effective method of predicting changes in the market's 
short and intermediate term trends . These predictions are based on 
studies of mass psychology as shown by the odd lot £igures . Neill's 
1956-60 record leads us to believe that his studies of mass psychology 
ar e excellent for predicting inter mediate trend changes . 
49 . 
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SECTION III 
BANK CREDIT ANALYST 
Of the various technical market systems, Drew and Neill 
were considered first because of the importance of investor psychology 
on stock prices. In this chapter, we will cover one of the two fore -
55 
most money services. A careful analysis of the 1956-60 record of 
the Bank Credit Analyst has convinced the aut~or that money studies 
are likely to be of at least comparable value to studies of psychology 
as for predicting stock market action. It will be shown in this 
chapter that the Bank Credit Analyst had an outstanding record during 
1956- 60. In those years, the Bank Credit Analyst would actually 
have been more helpful to traders than either Drew or Neill . 
METHODS USED BY BANK CREDIT ANALYST 
The basic principle of the Bank Credit Analyst is that an 
expanding economy creates a favorable climate for investments and a 
contracting economy an unfavorable climate. According to that publi-
cation, it is the flow of money which is the most effective gauge of 
exonomic expansion or contraction. The service keeps a close watch on 
55. 
Hamilton A. Bolton ed., Bank Credit Analyst. (Montreal, Bolton, 
Trembley & Co. ) . Those interested in reading a more thorough 
discussion of the methods used by this service than will be 
provided in this paper should write to Bolton, Tremblay & Co., 680 
Sherburne Street West , Montreal 2, Canada. A copy of the booklet 
entitled "Introduction to Bank Credit Analysis, " plus a reprint of 
the article "The Money Equation and Connnon Stocks" should be re-
quested. 
51. 
week to week changes in banking and credit trends . Throu gh an analysis 
of banking data, it claims to be able to provide advance information on 
prob~ble future market and business trends. 
Since the end of World War II, this country has gone through 
an extraordinary period of credit expansion. During these fifteen 
years, the basic trend of the stock market has been strongly upward, 
as is suggested by Chart I on page 50. Based on a study of American 
history and past monetary activities of the Feder al Reserve, the Bank 
Credit Analyst believes that eventually there will a gain be a period 
of credit contraction which will bring about a substantial decline in 
economic activity and stock prices . 
That publication feels that its studies will allow it to 
forecast this decline when it comes . Because of the importance of 
the flow of money, it also believes that the studies should continue 
to prove excellent for predicting intermediate term business and market 
moves as well. In this paper, we will be concerned only with how 
accurately the service forecast intermediate term market moves during 
1956- 60. 
Money Equation 
There are four principal indices u::;ed by the Bank Credit 
Analyst in forecasting stock market action. These indices are the 
Sensitive Composite Equity Index, Composite Bank Credit Barometer, 
Basic Composite Equity Index, and the Money Equation. The last of 
these is solely a long term indicator. 
is shown on page 63. 
A chart of the Money Equation 
The Money Equation is based on t.1e proven fact, according to 
52~ 
the Bank Credit Analyst, that borrowed money turns over faster than 
other kinds of money . Chart III on page 64 illustrates the close 
relationship which exists between the size of the bank loans, borrowed 
money, and the rapidity of turnover of demand deposits . This chart 
establishes that there is a correlation between the size of bank loans 
and the size of demand deposits. The Bank Credit Analyst next es-
tablished a "normal 1 relationship between the size of bank borrowings 
in relation to the money supply and the rapidity of turnover. 
That publication is concerned with whether actual money turn-
over is above or below normal . Below normal conditions in the past 
have been followed by major recessions. Consequently, as long as 
money turnover is above normal this is favorable for the market while 
below normal turnover is bearish. He can see from Chart II on page 63 
that the Money Equation has been bullish ever since early 1943. It 
is strictly a long-term indicator and is not used to predict inter-
mediate term market swings . Naturally, it is of virtually no value 
to the trader. 
Basic Composite Equity Index 
Chart IV on page 65 shows the Basic Composite Equity Index, 
Sensitive Composite Equity Index, and the Composite Bank Barometer. 
The Basic Composite Equity Index is derived from monthly ratios of 
national spending to debt accumulation. Ratios for twelve consecutive 
months are averaged. The figure derived is superimposed on a 3% per 
annum long-term trend line which is approximately the long-term trend 
56 
of stock prices since 1871. 
56 . 
Ibid., March, 1958, p . 15. 
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Because of this adjustment for secular trend, the ratio of 
debits to loans must rise 3% in a year just to hold its own. The 
basic rule of interpretation is that a 1% decline in the Index con-
stitutes a selling signal and a 1% advance a buying signal. However, 
this rule is not strictly f ollowed by the Bank Credi t Analyst . 
Obviously, i t would be possible for the 12 month ratio to be 
declining and yet have the Index move up 1% because it was overwhelmed 
by the 3% long-term trend . A 1% rise or decline which develops slowly 
is regarded with suspicion by the Bank Credit Analyst. From Chart IV 
on page 65 , we can see that the Basic Index gave a sell signal early 
in 1956 and a buy signal in the middle of 1958 . 
Sensitive Composite Equity Index 
54 . 
The Sensitive Composite Equity Index is computed substantially 
the same as the Basic Index. The only difference is that monthly 
figures are charted instead of average figures for twelve months. 
There are no set rules of interpretation for the Sensitive Index. 
Naturally, an upside breakout from a range in which it had remained 
for some time would be considered bullish by the Bank Credit Analyst. 
A downside breakout would be considered bearish. In addition, the 
higher the Index the more favorable the situation. 
Composite Bank Credit Barometer 
During 1956- 60 the Composite Bank Credit Barometer gave two 
signals as is shown by Chart IV on page 65 A rise in the Barometer 
to above + 5 provides a buy signal while a decline to below - 10 is a 
sell signal . Between + 5 and - 10 the Barometer is neutral . A buy 
signal was given in the middle of 1958 and a sell signal in the fall 
of 1959. 
This Barometer combines the spending debt accumulation con-
cept with an expanding and contracting mon~y supply concept. Each 
month's index figures are related to the figures of the like month the 
previous ~ear. The market position of the Bank Credit Analyst is 
determined mainly by the level of this Index, the Basic Composite Equity 
Index, and the Sensitive Composite Equity Index. 
RECORD OF BANK CREDIT ANALYST 1956-60 
In this section up to now, the author has provided the reader 
with an idea of the type of approach used by the Bank Credit Analyst. 
The remainder of this section will be concerned with the amount of 
success predicting the market's intermediate swings achieved by that 
organization during 1956-60. 
Bearish During the Greater Part of 1956 
As 1956 opened, the Bank Credit Analyst was bullish but felt 
that t here was a good chance of a market top within three to five months. 
However, in mid-March there was nothing in the bank credit approach 
which warned of imminent danger to the over-all equity situation. 
By the end of April, 1956, the Sensitive Composite Equity 
Index had fallen to its lowest point for a long period . It was as far 
beiow the Basic Composite Equity Index as at any time since October of 
1952 . In addition, the Basic Index had declined close to 1%. The 
55 . 
Composite Bank Credit Barometer had been -10 for several months. 
Traders would have sold at this time with the Dow around 510. The 
following month the decline in the Basic Index reached 1%. 
In June, the Composite Equity Sensitive and Basic Indices 
and the Composite Bank Credit Barometer all established new lows . 
A month later the Dow's late 1956 or early 1957 downside limit was in-
dicated to be 435 plus or minus 5%. At the conclusion of 1956, a con-
57 
solidation was predicted for the "next year or so" which would es -
tablish a solid base for a renewal of the basic bull market which 
began in 1949 . The reason for this longer-range optimism was that 
the long-term chart, the Money Equation, did not show any "basic dis-
58 
equilibrium." 
No Change Until October, 1957 
The Bank Credit Analyst predicted on January 29, 1957 that 
the Dow would decline into the 400-430 area before the basic trend of 
stock prices turned upward. In March, the forecast was made that 
the February low would probably be broken before the end of the year. 
The money picture showed a generally better trend during the next few 
months but was still bearish. In July, the picture deteriorated a 
little. 
The October issue was written only a few days after the Dow 
had reached its low of 416.15. 
57. 
Ibid., December, 1956, p. 12. 
58.--
Ibid . , December, 1956, p . 12. 
At that time an over-all money study 
56. 
by the Bank Credit Approach suggested that the stock market had prob-
ably completed a selling climax whose price level would represent the 
59 
low point for "some time to come . 11 Traders following the Bank Credit 
Approach would have re-established their long positions abandoned in 
April of the preceding year. 
Basically Bullish Now for Approximately Two Years 
While the Bank Credit Analyst did not consider the market to 
be in a major long-term buying area in October, it did consider the 
intermediate trend to have turned up . The money figures continued to 
improve during the following months. In May of 1958 , a change in the 
basic trend from bearish to bullish was recognized as the Basic Index 
had risen over 1%. Some time before, the Bank Credit Barometer had 
moved up over +10. It continued to rise subsequently. T!le Sensitive 
Index had been in a strong upward trend for several months . 
The Bank Credit Analyst issue of August 23, 1958 contained 
these statements: 11According to the Bank Credit Approach, this is not 
an intermediate rise in a cyclical bear market, this is a new cyclical 
bull market which started toward the end of 1957, and was recognized 
by our approach in the Spring of 1958 . (The beginning of the Inter-
mediate rise was recognized in our Bulletins from November on, although 
60 
it was not then known that this coincided with the cyclical upturn.) " 
The November issue indicated that the new bull market was still in its 
relatively early stages. At the end of 19 58, the Bank Credit Ana lyst 
59 . 
Ibid., October, 19 56 , p . 2. 
60. 
Ibid., September, 1958, p. 4 
57. 
58 . 
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was looking for a "relatively favorable" stock market in 1959 . 
On March 26, 1959, the statement was made that bank credit 
trends showed no indications of any turndown in the business or stock 
market outlook . However, by late May either a long sideways correction 
or a decline of up to 10% was expected . Since the money picture ,.;as 
still strong, a serious setback was not anticipated . However, some 
weakness was expected because t ne rate of advance in relation to de -
cline in individual issues was not keeping abreast the price level of 
the market as measured by t he Dow. 
At this juncture , an argument for doing some selling could 
have been made. However , such a position could find no support in 
the money figures . The Sensitive and Basic indices had both established 
new highs while the Bank Credit Baromet er was well above f5. Con-
sequently, we will not consider a sell signal as having been given in 
March of 19 59 . 
~Y August 26, 1959, there had been enough market weakness 
so that the Bank Credit Analysis felt the situation was a grea t deal 
sounder and that the upwar d trend should be resumed. The following 
comments were made: "The long-term cyclical trend remains up . We 
are perhaps past the half-way mark in t he 1958 - ? bull marke t. \lie 
62 
anticipate new highs in leading averages probably before 1959 closes . " 
61. 
Ibid., December, 1958 , p. 3. 
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The next issue pointed out that the position taken in August 
had been too bu111sh. Hm,;rever , the money situation was still sound. 
The worst possibility expected for the market was that a double top 
would be formed . 
Money Figures Indicate Need For Caution 
There was a change in the money picture in November for tne 
first time in approximately two years. Both the Basic Equity Index 
and the Sensitive Index were stationary at t heir peaks while the Bank 
Credit Barometer was well below -10 . As can be seen from Chart IV on 
page 65, the Bank Credit Barometer gave a sell signal in September 
almost exactly at the top of the market's intermediate term rise. 
Even though the over-all mon~y situation could be classified as neutral 
63 
at best, the Bank Credit Analyst still advised a 70% invested position. 
During the following month the money figures improved slightly. 
The Bank Credit Analyst felt that the economy lacked momentum and that 
no dynamic market action was likely on the upside for "some time to 
64 
come." To that organization, it appeared likely that the market rally 
would terminate in January of 1960 and that the Dow would then decline 
to at least the 620-40 area. 
63. 
64. 
In other words, 70% of one's total investment funds should be in 
common stocks with the remainder held in cash or its equivalen t 
such as high grade short-term bonds. 
Bank Credit Analyst, op. cit., January 7, 1960, p. 2 . 
The following statement summarized the position taken by the 
Bank Credit Analyst: 110n an intermediate trend basis, January 1960 
could be a time for extreme caution, keeping in mind, however, that no 
65 
full basic downtrend bank credit signal has yet been given. " 
A trader following the Bank Credit Analyst who had not sold 
in November would have done so now at around 680 on the Dow. 
Continuing caution over the intermediate term was advised the 
following month. However, it was pointed out that the money studies 
did not indicate that the cyclical bull market beginning in early 1958 
had ended. 
Money Trends Turn Favorable 
In July, the banking figures began to show improvement which 
continued i n August and September. The following statements appeared 
in the September 28, 1960 issue : 11Major bear markets do not follow an 
upturn in our Composite Equity Index. The year old consolidation is 
66 
thus anticipated as close to terminated. 11 
During August and September, the Basic Index recovered two-
thirds of its decline of the eight preceding months . From May through 
September, the Bank Credit Barometer rose steadily from -40 to -6. 
The probable resumption of the bull market beginning in 1958 was pre-
dieted on October 26. A good rise was anticipated as the following 
65. 
Ibid., January, 1960, p . 5 
66 .--
Ibid., November, 1960, p. 5 
60. 
quote from the issue written at that time illustrates . " What we are 
looking for from here may be something in the order of only 25-35%, i . e., 
67 
an objective perhaps in the 700's in the Dow Jones Indus t rials . n 
Consequently, traders who had abandoned their long positions 
around the 680 level in the Dow would now be buying back approximately 
100 points lower. During the remainder of 1960, bank credit trends 
continued to become more encouraging. 
Record in Brief 
A t rader following the Bank Credit Analyst would have been 
bullish as 1956 began. He would have sold in April of that year . 
The Dow was then about 510. Long positions would have been reestablished 
in October of 1957 around the 430 level . It seems likely that no sell -
ing would subsequently have been undertaken until December of 1959 
Dow then around 680 . Buying would next have been done late in October 
of 1960 with the Dow at about the 580 level. 
Under our interpretation, the Bank Credit Analyst sold, bought, 
sold, and bought during 1956-60. If we consider only the one time 
when stocks were both bought and sold, we find the Bank Credit Analyst 
showing an advantage of 250 Dow points . To these 250 points could be 
added the difference between the level of the Dow at the start of 1956 
and in late April of that year plus the amount of the rise from late 
October of 1960 through the end of the year . The addition of these 
two figures brings the advantage to 310 points . Considering that the 
67. 
Ibid . , November, 1960, p . 5 . 
61. 
Dow rose only 130 points during 1956-60, it is apparent that the Bank 
Credit Analyst can be proud of its record. 
Conclusion 
The Bank Credit Analyst approach is somewhat similar to that 
of Neill as it is also concerned with predicting intermediate and long-
term changes in trend and not short - term swings . Whereas Neill did 
not have quite as good a record as Drew during 1956 - 60, we have found 
that the Bank Credit Analyst had a better record than Drew. We have 
already concluded that Drew and Neill have both developed an excellent 
market forecasting method . Consequently, it must be concluded that 
the Bank Credit Analyst approach is also an excellent one. 
62 . 
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SECTION IV 
CHARACTER OF THE MARKET - LOWRY 
Character - of - the - market methods of forecasting future 
price trends are ones which attempt to probe beneath the surface 
appearance of price movements. One of the best known character - of 
- the - market methods is represented by the calculations of "Buying 
Power vs. Selling Pressure" published by Lowry's Investment Reports . 
LOWRY APPROACH 
In this chapter, we will show that the Lowry approach is 
another technical method which is useful to the trader. Lowry did 
not have as good a record during 1956-60 as Neill, Drew, or the Bank 
Credit Analyst. However, a person following these Reports would 
have shown a net advantage for the period. 
According to Lowry, the trend of the market is governed by 
the simple fundamental law of Supply versus Demand. The total net 
daily gains and/or losses for all issues traded on the New York Stock 
Exchange are considered to be indicative of the increase or decrease 
of B~ying Power and/or Selling Pressure. 
Illustration of Basic Idea 
Let us assume that an investor wants to determine the amount 
of buying necessary to cause an issue to advance two points. On 
Monday he finds that he has to purchase 10,000 shares to push the s tock 
up two points. The following day 30,000 shares have to be bought to 
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achieve the same results. 
It is apparent t t1at the rise in t ne issue was meeting more 
resistance on Tuesday than on Honday. In other words, the stock was 
in a weaker technical position. The Lowry Reports apply this basic 
idea of watching the movement of stocks in relation to their volume 
to the market as a whole . 
Four Totals 
Each day's market activity on the New York Stock Exchange 
is reduced by the Reports to four totals, which are : (1) A total of 
the gains made by s t ocks which advanced that day. (2) The total 
vo lume of these stocks. (3) A total of the losses recorded by issues 
which declined that day . (4) The total volume of these issues . 
The total gain divided by the upside volume gives the average 
gain of the advancing stocks while the total loss divided by downside 
volume gives the average loss of the declining stocks . If it is 
easier for the market to move upward than downward, the average gain 
per share should be greater than the average loss per share. The 
reverse should be true if the market's path of least resistance is 
downward . 
Three Indices 
A "Buying Power" Index is derived from the data concerning 
the gains. It is a two month moving average compiled daily. From 
the data on losses, a similar "Selling Pressure" Index is derived . 
A much shorter (about 2 1/2 weeks) moving average of the upside figures 
is also calculated . It is called the "Short Term Index of Buying 
67. 
Power. " The action of these three indices, interpreted in accordance 
with various rules, provides the Lowry Reports with a method for de-
termining when the market is in a buying range and when it is in a top 
68 
area. 
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That organization has published a pamphlet which provides a 
det ailed discussion of how the action of the indexes should be inter-
preted . There are three different buy signals described and two sell 
signals . For each signal there is at least one control. In other 
words, developments subsequent to the giving of a signal may indicate 
that it was incorrect . 
In general, a rising "Buying Power" index has bullish 
connotations, while increasing " Selling Pressure" has the opposite 
meaning. There are exceptions, though, with one being if either index 
has progressed to such an extreme point that it is logical to look for 
a reversal . 
RECORD 1956-60 
The rules for the buy and sell signals are quite definite. 
Consequently, the interpretation placed on the indexes by an individual 
should be closely in line with the interpretation given t nem by t he 
Lowry Reports . A careful study of the indexes by the aut~or shows 
twelve buy signals and ten sell signals during 1956- 60. The record 
68. 
69. 
A top area i s a price range from which there is a market decline 
of sufficient proportions to make selling advisable while the 
market is within the range . 
Lowry's Market Trend Ana lysis, Lowry ' s Reports, Inc., New York 
City, 1959 . 
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of Lowry during that period is shown by Tables IV and V on pages 70 
and 71 . 
Two Ways of Figuring the Record 
In an earlier chapter, the author mentioned that at the be-
ginning of 1956 the Dow was around 485 and at the conclusion of 1960 
130 points higher, or 615. During this period, a person following 
Lowry would have had a net advantage of 322 Dow points, based on the 
level of the Dow at the time all the various signals were given. 
To obtain the 322 point net advantage it would, of course, 
have been necessary to sell short at the times of the sell signals . 
If no short selling was done, the net advantage would have been 221 
points as is shown by Table V on page 71. If commissions are deducted 
a net advantage of approximately 75 points remains. 
Most Useful During Important Moves 
Because of the various rules of interpretation, the Lowry 
70 
Reports will never miss the major part of an important market move . 
They may not correctly forecast the beginning of a major advance or 
decline, bu t if they do not, the correct signal must be given before 
71 
the move has progressed very far . 
In times such as 1960 when the marke t has a series of short 
moves which are reversed before they make much headway, the Lowry 
Approach often is not effective. 
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Drew, op . cit., p. 63 . 
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Ibid., p . 63 
Tables IV and V on pages 70 and 71 
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TABLE IV 
LOllRY' S RECORD 1956-60: 
FROM SIGNAL TO SIGNAL* 
Advantage Disadvantage 
Date of Date of Level of from Preceding from Preceding 
Bui: Signal Sell Signal Dow Signal Signal 
2/9/56 470 
5/23/56 481 11 
6/11/56 481 
9/25/56 488 7 
10/2/56 477 11 
4/23/57 494 
-7./31/57 512 35 
8/28/57 482 30 
10/30/57 442 40 
1/24/58 452 10 
4/30/59 628 176 
6/17/59 630 2 
8/10/59 665 35 
9/9/59 664 
9/24/59 636 28 
12/24/59 678 
1/19/60 654 18 
6/6/60 639 15 
7/12/60 642 3 
8/12/60 630 12 
9/16/60 606 24 
10/6/60 589 17 
398 76 
Net Advantage 322 points 
* Computed from Lowry Reports 1956- 60 
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TABLE V 
LOWRY'S RECORD 1956-60: FROM 
BUY SIGNAL TO SELL SIGNAL * 
Level of Dow Level of Dow 
Date of Date of Time of Time of 
Bul Signal Sell Signal Bal Signal Sell Signal Advantage Disadvantage 
2/9/56 5/23/56 470 481 11 
6/11/':>6 9/25/56 481 488 7 
10/2/56 7/ 31/57 477 512 35 
8/28/57 10/30/57 482 442 40 
1/24/58 4/30/59 452 628 176 
6/17/59 8/10/59 630 665 35 
9/24/59 1/19/60 636 654 18 
6/6/60 7/12/60 639 642 3 
8/12/60 9/16/60 630 606 24 
285 65 
Net Advantage 221 points 
* Computed from Lowry Reports 1956- 60 
show that the Lowry record in 1960 was not impressive. The Lowry 
Approach works best during intermediate market moves. Tables IV and 
V show that the Lowry Reports correctly forecast nearly all of the 
1958-59 market rise. 
Conclusion 
Computing the records from signal to signal and deducting 
commissions, we find net advantages of 185, 215, 235, and 75 points 
shown by Neill, Drew, Bank Credit Analyst, and the Lowry Reports, res-
pectively, during 1956- 60. Only in the case of the Lowry Reports is 
the advantage less than the 130 point advance by the Dow. 
One conclusion which can be drawn from the record of the 
three methods discussed thus far is that the Lowry Approach should be 
given less weight than the other three approaches. However, since 
the Lowry Reports are almost certain to be on the right side of any sig-
nificant market move, it should prove beneficial for the trader to know 
their market position . 
72. 
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SECTION V 
BARRON'S CONFIDENCE INDEX 
Up to now, four different methods which can be used to fore -
cast the future trend of the market as a whole have been discussed . 
It was possible to obtain a concrete idea of the record achieved through 
the use of each method . These records were not based on an analysis 
made in retrospect but on forecasts made as events were developing. 
In this chapter , we will discuss a relatively new forecasting 
method . The market forecasts obtained through the use of this approach 
depend on the level of an index known as Barron's Confidence Index. 
72 
Mr . Joseph E. Granville is primarily responsible for popularizing the 
Index . 
The Confidence Index has been in existence since 1932 but was 
not used as a device for predicting stock market action until late i~ 1959. 
Consequently, unlike the f our methods covered thus far, the Confidence 
Index has to be judged mainly through hindsight . In retrospect, it 
appears that the Confidence Index has bean an accurate market forecaster. 
We will now consider what the approach entails and then take a look at 
the record. 
72 . 
Mr. Granville writes the Hutton Daily Market Wire and is the author 
of the recently published book .. A Strategy of Daily Stock Market 
Timing for Maximum Profit." Complete bibliography is in footnote 73. 
USE OF THE INDEX FOR PREDICTIVE PURPOSES 
The Index is the ratio of the yield of Barron's 10 High Grade 
bonds to the yield on the Dow-Jones 40- Bond Average. For example, if 
Barron's 10 High-grade bonds were yielding 4% while the yield on the Dow-
Jones 40-Bond Average was 5%, the Index would be 80.0 . The ten bonds 
used by Barron's are of highest grade while the Dow Jones 40-Bond Index 
is composed of secondary grade issues. Consequently, the yield on the 
latter Index will always be higher than on the former. 
Increasing Confidence Brings Higher Ratios 
If investors are showing increasing confidence in the economic 
outlook by purchasing lower grade issues, the ratios obtained by dividing 
the average yield on Barron ' s bonds by the average yield on the Dow-Jones 
bonds will be rising. Should investors be cautious and thus buying top 
grade liens, the ratios would be declining. 
For example, let us assume that a top grade bond sells for 80, 
pays a 4% coupon, and consequently yields 5%. If there should be enough 
buying of the bond to advance the price to 100, the yiel d would naturally 
decline to 4%. From this example, the reader can see that if the prices 
of high grade bonds are rising the yields will be declining. This decline 
in yields will bring about a downward trend in the Confidence Index assum-
ing, of course, that the yields on lower grade issues are not declining 
as rapidly. A decline in the Index is a bearish market indication as 
will be shown subsequently. 
74. 
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Bond Buyers More Sophisticated Than Stock Buyers 
Mr. Granville makes the statement that "the flow of smart money 
73 
shows up in the bond market before it shows up in the stock market . n 
The basic premise for this statement appears to be that people who deal 
in bonds are more sophisticated investors than those who deal in stocks . 
This assumption seems logical to the author . In all the instances with 
which he is familiar - at least 20 - of people becoming interested in in-
vesting no attention was paid to bonds. It seems to be only among those 
with considerable investment experience that much buying and selling 
of bonds is found. 
Smart money can, of course, be easily identified in retrospect . 
If the market goes down, the smart money is that which was withdrawn 
from the market before prices declined. Conversely, if prices advance, 
the smart mon~y came in just before the rise started. 
The Confidence Index is supposed to indicate whether the smart 
money is gravitat ing toward safety or risk . If Barron's Confidence 
Index indicates that so-called sophisticated investors are willing to 
assume gr eater risks, the market outlook is considered by Mr . Granville 
to be favorable . Increasing cautiousness on the part of these investors 
augurs poorly for future stock prices. 
Lead Time of Index 
A natural question to ask at this point is how long is it likely 
to be before a change in tne Confidence Index is reflected i n the stock 
73 . 
Joseph E. Granville, A Strategy of Daily Stock Market Timing for 
Maximum Profits, (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 
1960, p. 102. 
market. According to Mr. Granville, the Confidence Index is generally 
two to four months ahead of the stock market. In his book, he makes 
the following statements regarding timing: 
"The stock market has never gone down following a 
lengthy series of Index advances and the market 
has never continued to rise following a series of 
Index declines. In a positive sense, the market 
has always risen following a rising trend in the 
Confidence Index and has fallen following a declin-
ing trend in the Index. The lead time is generally 
two to four months.n 74 
RECORD OF INDEX 
Mr. Granville claims that the Index correctly predicted the 
1932 market bottom, the 1937 top and ensuing dip, the 1946 high and sub-
sequent decline, the 1956-57 triple top, the 1957 drop, the s harp advance 
in 1958 -59, and the early 1960 decline. We will now consider in more 
detail the record of the Index starting in late May of 1957 . Table VI 
on the following page shows that the Index turned down almost exactly 
two months before the 1957 decline got under way. 
1958,lgsgand Early 1960 Record in More Detail 
From a low point of 75 . 6 on January 13, 1958, the Index re-
corded a virtually straight line advance to 89.0 on September 15, 1958. 
For several months then it did not make a sustained move in either dir-
ection. However, it did reach a new high of 89.2 on January 26, 1959 
which was exceeded on June 1, 1959 and again on September 21, 1959 . 
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Ibid., pp. 102, 103 
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TABLE VI 
FORECASTING OF 19 57 DOlVNTURN * 
Date Index Dow-Jones Industrials 
5/22/57 89 . 9 504. 02 
5/29/5 7 89.1 504. 93 
6/5/57 88.7 505 . 63 
6/12/57 88 . 0 511.79 
6/19/57 86.8 500. 00 
6/26/57 86.0 503.29 
7/3/57 87.8 516.89 
7/10/57 87.1 520 . 77 
7/17/57 88 . 0 515 . 73 
7/24/57 88.3 514. 59 
7/31/57 87.5 505 . 10 
8/7/57 87.2 496 . 78 
8/14/57 87.4 488.20 
8/21/57 86.6 475.74 
8/28/57 85.7 484.35 
9/4/57 85.1 478 . 63 
9/11/57 85.8 481.02 
9/18/57 85.0 468 . 42 
9/25/57 86 . 0 456.89 
10/2/57 84. 2 461.70 
10/9/57 83.6 441.16 
10/16/57 83 . 3 433 . 83 
10/23/5 7 82.3 435 . 15 
* Joseph E. Granville, A Strategy of Daily Stock Market Timing for Maximum 
Profit,(Englewood Cliffs, New Jers~y, Prentice-Hall, 1960) p. 106. 
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Date 
9/21/59 
9/28/59 
10/5/59 
10/12/59 
10/19/59 
10/26/59 
11/2/59 
11/9/59 
11/16/59 
11/23/59 
11/30/59 
12/7/59 
12/14/59 
12i21i59 
12/28/ 59 
1/4/60 
1/11/60 
1/18/60 
1/25/60 
2ili60 
2/8/60 
2/15/60 
2/22/60 
2/29/60 
3/7/60 
3/14/60 
3/21/60 
3/28/60 
4/4/60 
4/11/60 
4/18/60 
4/25/ 60 
5/2/60 
5/9/60 
5116/60 
TABLE VII 
FORECASTING OF 1960 DECLINE * 
Index 
89 . 7 
88 . 9 
88 . 2 
86.4 
85 . 3 
86 . 5 
85 . 8 
85.2 
85.3 
85 . 3 
85 . 3 
84. 4 
84 . 0 
85.0 
84. 6 
84.7 
85 . 7 
85 .1 
86 .0 
86.1 
85.7 
86 .1 
85 . 7 
85 . 0 
84 .7 
84. 4 
84. 2 
83 . 0 
83 . 5 
83 . 0 
83 .0 
82 . 8 
82 8 
81.5 
79 . 9 
Dow-Jones Industrials 
618 . 15 
636 . 47 
637 .01 
638 .55 
639 . 66 
637 . 61 
645.46 
650. 92 
634. 46 
646. 75 
659 . 18 
665.9 7 
675 .07 
675 . 92 
669 . 77 
679 . 06 
667 . 16 
653.86 
645 . 86 
622.62 
619 . 43 
622. 23 
628 . 45 
630. 12 
604.02 
606 .79 
617 . 00 
621 . 78 
618.54 
624 . 89 
630. 77 
611. 13 
599.65 
607 . 48 
617 . 39 
* Joseph E. Granville, A Strategy of Daily Stock Market Timing for 
Maximum Profit (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, Prentice Hall, 1960) 
pp . 111,112. 
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The index then began a lengthy decline as is shown by Table 
VIII on page 86 . In retrospect, it is apparent that late in September 
of 1959 the Index began predicting that the market was going to experience 
difficulties in 1960. It was still predicting the same thing on May 16 . 
Heaknesses of the Index 
As mentioned earlier, the Index is considered to lead the mar-
ket by from two to four months. Consequently, it is not very exact 
from a timing standpoint which is one of its weaknesses. Another weak-
ness is that at many times it is difficult to interpret exactly what 
the Index is forecasting. At the beginning of this section, the author 
mentioned t hat the Confidence Index had been an accurate market fore-
caster . 
However, the reader will remember that, this statement was 
qualified by the phrase "in retrospect." In his book, Mr . Granville 
proves that it would have been possible in the past to interpret the 
Confidence Index to considerable market advantage. It must be pointed 
out, though, that interpretations made with the benefit of hindsight may 
differ from those which might be made at the time the events were occurring. 
Conclusion 
The basic idea of the flow of smart money appearing in the 
bond market before the stock market seems sound. However, until we 
have a sound basis for judging the Index through foresight instead of 
hindsight, l ess reliance should probably be placed on it than on Drew, 
Neill, Lowry, and the Bank Credit Analyst. It is a technical approabh 
which has yet to prove itself, but could very well do so during coming 
years and thus seems worth watching. 
SECTION VL 
X SERVICE ON THE MARKET 
We have now considered the record of five technical approaches 
--Neill, Drew, Bank Credit Analyst, Lowry's Reports, and Barron's Confi -
dence Index. From the preceding discussion, the reader has learned 
that, over a reasonable period of time, use of a sound technical approach 
is like~y to produce above average market forecasting results . However, 
would a sound fundamental approach produce even better results? This 
is the question which we will attempt to answer in this section. 
What we will do is discuss the 1956-60 market forecasting 
record of one of the leading bulletin services -- X Service. It seems 
reasonable to assume that X Service employs a sound fundamental approach 
and has had as good a record as most fundamental services . If such 
were not the case, it is unlikely that, for many years now, it would 
have remained one of the most widely read of the bulletin services. 
Once we have discussed the 1956-60 record, we will be in a position to 
judge whether it was better or worse than that of the technical services. 
SEMI-ANNUAL AND ANNUAL FORECAST REPORTS 1956-60 
A policy of publishing annual and semi-annual forecast reports 
is followed . The market position in the regular weekly reports often 
is not exact enough to allow one to judge its accuracy. However, in 
the forecas t bulletins, a very precise market prediction is made. 
Let us now consider what was said in the ten successive annual 
80. 
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and semi-annual forecast issues starting with the one of December 12, 
1955. The Dow was then 490. Two different forecasts were presented 
at that time -- one in the event President Eisenhower ran again and the 
other in case he did not. If President Eisenhower was again a candidate , 
the range of the Dow for 1956 was predicted to be 400-560 and 440-510 if 
he was not. On June 11, 1956, with t he Dow at 483, a slightly more con-
servative position was taken and a range of 440-530 forecast for the 
second half of the year. At that time the following comments were made. 
nThe action so far looks like a normal correction of an 
overextended position. We do not expect prices to dip 
below the 440 level during the second half year, and 
later on a new high by a small margin seems possible --
say to around 530. We strongly recommend that a portion 
of your stock funds be held in reserve and invested in 
short term bonds or savings deposits. A conservative 
reserve position for the average investor now would be 
up to a third of total stock funds . " 75 
1956 Forecasts Fair 
As one can see from Chart I on page 50, the Dow fluctuated 
between 525 and 460 during 1956. Consequently, the forecasts made on 
December 12, 1955 and June 11, 1956 were neither particularly bad nor 
good, but might be considered fair as the market did hold within the pre -
dieted range. 
Predictions for 1957 
On December 10, 1956 when the Dow was 490 a range of 450-530 
was predicted for 1957. It was pointed out that since the bull market 
76 
was the longest, and second largest on record, a "fair degree" of caution 
75 . 
X Service June 11, 1956, p. 7. 
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Ibid., December 10, 1956, p. 7. 
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was called for. However, the strong business picture was considered to 
put a firm floor under the market and 1957 was expected to be a year of 
consolidation on a relatively high plateau . 
\~en the mid-year forecast was made on June 17 with the Dow at 
511, no change was made in the range forecast on December 10, 1956. 
Once again the business picture was pointed out as a supporting factor 
and it was indicated that circumstances favored a positive investment 
policy. 
Record Not as Good as in 1956 
A glance at Chart I on page 50 shows that the forecasts of 
market action in 1957 were not as accurate as the forecasts made in the 
preceding year . The Dow slightly exceeded 520 in July so the upside 
figure of 530 was good . However, a too bullish position was taken in 
June considering that the Dow declined sharply in the last half of the 
year to around 415 . 
Forecasts for 1958 
In the December 9, 1957 Bulletin, the prediction was made that 
the recession would be mild and virtually completed by mid-year . How-
ever, it was also pointed out that 1958 was unlikely to usher in any 
great new bull market . A range of 400-480 for the year was forecast . 
At that time the Dow was 440. 
The June 16, 1958 Report pointed out that the market was acting 
77 
"extremely well" and seemed to be saying that the recession was nearly 
77. 
Ibid., June 16, 1958, p. 7. 
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over, the position taken by X Service . It was also indicated in that 
Bulletin, however, that the market might be appraising prospects too gen-
erously too soon and that it had to be regarded as high in relation to 
near-term earnings and dividend prospects. A conservative position was 
thus taken and a range of 430-500 for the second half year predicted. 
The high of this range was 30 points above the then prevailing level of 
the Dow. 
Position Too Cautious 
As one can see from Chart I on page 50, the market moved steadily 
upward all year. The low was slightly below 430 while the high, which 
occurred almost exactly at the end of 1958, was slightly above 590. 
Consequently, in both December of 1957 and June of 1958 a more conservative 
position was taken than subsequently seemed warranted . 
Predictions for 1959 
On December 8, 1958 with the Dow at 560, the Annual Forecast 
Bulletin carried a forecast of a range of 525-650 for the Dow in 1959. 
That Report indicated that new highs in such things as production, con-
sumer income, retail sales, and construction would provide a " broadly 
78 
favorable" background for the market in 1959 . 
During the following six months the market was strong and on 
June 15, 1959 the Dow stood at 627. In the Report of tha t date a range 
of 600-675 for the following six months was predicted. X Service con-
78 . 
Ibid., December 8, 1959, p. 7. 
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sidered the business picture to be "well -nigh faultless 1' and no serious 
market upset was expected. However, more frequent int erruptions of the 
main trend than heretofore were forecast . Such periods of reaction 
were indicated to be buying opportunities . 
Too Caut ious Again but Creditable Showing 
The a ctual low of the Dow in 1959 was slightly above 570 and 
was recorded in February while the high of the year of around 685 was 
established in August. As for 1958, the forecasts for the market in 
1959 were on the conservative side. However, unlike those of December 
9 , 1957 and June 16, 1958, the predictions of December 8, 1958 and June 
15, 1959 were creditable. 
1960 Forecasts 
Unfortunately for the followers of this Service, however, the 
two forecasts for 1960 were at least as bad as the preceding two were 
good . On December 7, 1959 with the Dow standing at 663, the following 
comments were made . 
79. 
"The stock market approa ches the new year in a bu9yant mood. 
The prospects for active business, increased earnings , and 
larger dividends provide good support for investor confidence. 
l.Jeighing all factors on balance, a range of 625-750 for the 
Dow is a reasonable measure of the possibilities in 1960. 
This allows for a moderate 15% advance in the Average from 
present levels, which is about in line with the expectati on 
for corporate profits . 11 80 
Ibid . , June 15, 1959, p . 7 
80.--
Ibid., December 7, 1959, p . 7. 
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Again on June 13, 1960, with the Dow then at 655, chief empha-
sis was placed on the expectation of improving corporate profits pro-
85. 
viding the impetus for better stock prices . An improvement in the business 
picture was looked for during the following six months and, consequently, 
a good stock market . \Vhile not as great an upward move was anticipated 
as on December 7, 1959, X Service did expect the Dow to exceed 700 by 
the end of the year. 
Position Too Bullish 
After reaching a high of slightly over 688 early in January, 
the market then turned downward and declined approximately 122 points 
during the following nine months, reaching a low of around 566 in October. 
By the end of the year it had recovered to about 615 . Whereas X Service 
was too cautious on the market in 1958, it was too bullish in 1960 as it 
clearly looked for the basic trend of stock prices in that year to be 
upward . 
1956-60. 
Conclusion 
Table VIII on page 86 summarizes the record of X Service during 
Because we have considered only the market position taken twice 
during each year, it is impossible to directly compare the record of X 
Service with the showing of Drew, Neill, Lowry, Bank Credit Analyst and 
Barron's Confidence Index. However, the reader should now have a clear 
idea of how the records compare. 
There is no question that Neill, Drew, and the Baru< Credit 
Analyst all made a better showing than X Service during the years covered. 
86. 
The author believes t hat the records of Lowry and Barron 's Confidence 
Index also were more impressive than the record of X Service. On the 
whole, X Service definitely was outperformed by the technical services. 
TABLE VIII 
RECORD OF X SERVICE 1956-60* 
Date of Tone of Level of Range Approximate Rating of 
Forecast Reeort Dow Forecast Actual Range Forecast 
12/12/55 Neutral 490 440-560 460-525 Fair 
6/11/56 Cautious 483 440-530 460-525 Fair 
12/.10/56 Neutral 490 450-530 415-525 Poor 
6/17/57 Optimistic 5ll 450-530 415-525 Very Poor 
12/9/57 Neutral 440 400-480 425-590 Poor 
6/16/ 58 Conservative 470 430-500 470-590 Very Poor 
12/8/58 Bullish 560 525-650 510- 685 Good 
6/15/59 Bullish 627 600-675 615 - 680 Good 
12/7 I 59 Bullish 663 625 -750 565 - 685 Very Poor 
6/13/60 Bullish 655 7-700 565-655 Very Poor 
* Computed from various Reports of X Service, 1956-60. 
CONCLUSION 
By using sound market forecasting methods such as those de-
veloped by Drew, Neill, Lowry, and the Bank Credit Analyst, the true 
technician believes he will be aware of a change in the trend of stock 
prices several months before there is a change in the trend of basic 
business indicators. Consequently, he feels that a study of fundamental 
data is likely to be moro of a hindrance to him than a help. 
He has seen that the over-all showing of the technical services 
covered was better than the performance of X Service. There is one 
additional point that should be mentioned which makes the technical case 
even stronger. 
The fact that five fundamental studies all suggest that selling 
of stocks is advisable does not add to the validity of the indication 
since the same basic approach would have been used in all instances. 
However , if five technical methods of different types all advised selling, 
the probabilities of their all being incorrect are extremely low. If 
four technical services are bullish and one bearish, the odds against 
81 
the latter being right are 66 to one. We are assuming, of course, 
that the five technical methods are equally reliable . 
From the preceding discussion, we can conclude that by following 
several sound technical methods, instead of just one, the investor would 
be substantially increas1ng his chances of being right on the trend of 
the market . An opinion reached through a study of fundamentals would 
not add to, or detract from a market viewpoint arrived at by following 
81 
Drew, op . cit ., p . 253. 
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several sound technical methods. As far as the market as a whole is 
concerned, fundamentals should probably be disregarded completely. 
89 . 
SECTION VII 
CHARTS SHOWING PRICE ACTION AND VOLUME - MAGEE 
If a system were ever devised that could predict the trend of 
the market with 100% accuracy, only half the battle would be won. The 
old saying of 11when you buy is just as important as what you buy11applies 
equally well in reverse . In other words, it is just as important to 
purchase the right stocks as to buy stocks at the right time . 
Let us assume that a person has correctly decided that the mar-
ket is going to advance. Nat urally, he prefers to be holding only issues 
which are likely to rise more rapidly than the Dow. In making his 
specific selections, should he concentrate primarily on fundamentals or 
on technical factors? This is the question which we will attempt to 
answer in most of the remainder of this paper. 
The approach toward individual stocks used by Darvas was, of 
course , a simple one . What he did was purchase strong market performers 
whose volume was increasing as they advanceu and then place stop loss 
orders under them. At the opposite extreme in terms of complexity is 
the approach used by John Magee . 
Briefly, Mr. Magee watches charts which show trading volume 
and high, low, and closing prices . The most frequently used charts 
are those kept on a daily basis. However, weekly and monthly charts are 
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also carefully followed . 
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Anyone interested in this approach should read the book 11Technical 
Analysis of Stock Trends, 11 Robert D. Edwards and John Magee, Jr. 
(Springfield, Massachusetts, Stock Tbend Service, 1948). 
Actually, there are only three basic technical approaches to 
individual issues. There is the Magee approach of watching charts show-
ing price action and volum~ ; the Darvas approach of watching the market 
performance of various issues, and point and figure charting. As 
mentioned in the introduction, the latter of these appears to be the least 
valuable and will not be covered in this paper. In this section, the 
methods used by Magee will be discussed while the relative market action 
approach will be covered in the next section. 
VARIOUS PATTERNS 
There are two broad types of patterns which l-1r . Magee looks 
for when studying the charts. These are called reversal and consoli-
dation patterns. Those patterns of the first type indicate that the 
basic price trend of a stock is going to change, while the latter patterns 
suggest a continuation of the present trend. 
The basic reversal formations are (1) Head-and-Shoulders, (2) 
Rounding, (3) Triangle, (4) Rectangle, (5) Broadening, (6) Diamond, and 
(7) Double and triple tops and bottoms . The first of these reversal 
formations is one of the more common and also the most reliable of the 
major reversal patterns. It will be discussed in detail . The other 
formations will be covered more briefly. 
Head-and- Shoulders Formations 
A hypothetical Head-and-Shoulders Top formation is illustrated 
by Chart V on page ~0~ We can see that it consists of a left shoulder, 
a head, and a right shoulder . The left shoulder is formed by a sharp 
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rise on high volume which culminates an extensive upward move, followed 
by a decline on reduced volume. Next, the head is formed. A rise on 
increasing volume carries quotations for the issue above t he peak of 
the left shoulder. Then, there is a reaction on reduced volume which 
takes prices below the top of the left shoulder - usually close to the 
bottom of the right half of that shoulder. 
For the right shoulder, there is another rise, but on sub-
stantially less volume than the two preceding ones. This advance fails 
to reach as high as the top of the head before another decline begins. 
The "breakout" from the Head-and-Shoulders Top occurs when prices break 
at least 3% below a line drawn across the bottoms of the two preceding 
declines, called the neckline. 
A Head-and-Shoulders Bottom is basically the reverse of a 
Head-and-Shoulders Top. However, volume must show a noticeable pick-up 
during the upper part of the right shoulder, and the llbreakout" from 
the formation must be accompanied by high volume. In other words, 
while Magee considers a decline through the neckline of a Head-and-
Shoulders Top on low volume to be a valid signal, an advance from a Head-
and-Shoulders bottom is not trusted unless it occurs on high volume. 
Rounding Formations 
Rounding Bottoms and Tops are exactly what their names signify. 
The former are commonly referred to as Bowl or Saucer patterns and the 
latter as Inverted Bowls. Chart VI on pagel09 shows the rounding 
bottom in J.I. Case which occurred in 1932. 
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The volume pattern at bottoms is usually a clear cut one 
resembl ing the price action of the stock . A clearly defined volume 
pattern on a Rounding Top is not a common occurrence. 
seen, it will be the same as on a Rounding Bottom. 
When one is 
As opposed to the position taken with the Head-and-Shoulders 
formation, Magee feels that when prices turn down in completion of a 
Rounding Top no action should be taken unless volume expands. 
Triangles 
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A triangle is most commonly a consolidation pattern, but does 
develop occasionally when a change in a stock's basic trend is occurring. 
The commonest form of triangle is the one formed by drawing a line through 
the top of two or more rallies which slopes downward and a line through 
the bottom of two or more declines which slopes upward. It is called 
a Symmetrical Triangle. An example of this type of triangle is shown 
by Chart VII on page 110 There is seldom any clue to the direction 
which the move out of this triangle will take until the "breakoutn 
actually comes . To be valid, an upside break must be on high volume . 
In addition to the S~etrical Triangles , there are also 
ascending and descending or Right -Angle Triangles. Chart VIII on page 
111 gives us an example of a Right -Angle Triangle . If a triangle 
has a descending top and a horizontal bottom, it is of the descending 
type . It is an ascending triangle if the top line is horizontal and 
the bottom line ascending. Unlike the Symmetrical Triangle where there 
is no indication which way the breakout will be, Right-Angle Triangles 
should breakout through the horizontal line if they act the way they are 
supposed to. 
Reasoning Behind the Triangle Patterns 
For the various patterns to have forecasting value, there must 
be a logical explanation of the interpretations placed on them by Magee. 
Let us consider for a moment the reasoning Magee uses to explain the 
various triangle patterns, taking up the Symmetrical Triangle first. 
We will start with a stock which has advanced from 30 to 60 
and then declined around 10 points. A round figure is often a mental 
profit objective and at 60 many investors who had sizeable profits were 
willing to accept them. This profit taking made the supply of the 
stock greater than demand for it. As prices receded, profit taking 
gradually became less and less of a factor . Also, many people who had 
been attracted to the stock, but had not bought before, viewed the decline 
as an excellent opportunity to make purchases. 
A rally then begins and takes the stock back toward 60. How-
ever, this time many of those who did not establish their profits the 
last time it was at that level are willing to accept a smaller gain and 
begin selling before 60 is reached. Similarly, potential buyers are now 
willing to pay higher prices and do not wait for the stock to come all the 
way back to 50 before attempting to fill their orders. It is easy to 
visualize the progress repeating itself until one side or the other has 
completed all contemplated transactions. Subsequently, a substantial 
advance (or decline) is a natural occurrence as professionals realize 
it is easy to move the stock since there are no buy (or sell) orders 
overhanging the market. 
An Ascending Triangle is generally caused by a growing demand 
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for a particular issue meeting a large block of shares for sale at a 
particular price. Once this supply is absorbed it is logical to look 
for tne stock to move upward . The explanation of a Descending Triangle 
is just the opposite. A large order below the market is eventually 
absorbed and prices then break sharply below the level at which this 
order was placed. 
Rectangles 
Like the triangle, the rectangle is more often a consolidation 
than a reversal formation, but may occur when the basic price trend of a 
stock is reversing from down to up . A perfect rectangle would be one 
which could be bounded both top and bottom by horizontal lines. How-
ever, this pattern is still valid if the upper and lower boundary lines 
are virtually parallel but either slightly up-sloping or down-sloping . 
As with a Symmetrical Triangle, it is impossible to tell which way the 
move out of a rectangle will be until the breakout occurs . Chart IX on 
page 111 provides us with an example of a rectangle. 
Broadening Formations 
Broadening Formations general ly appear only during the final 
stages of a long bull market. According to Magee, they carry bearish 
implications nine times out of ten. They occur in the form of either 
inverted Symmetrical, Ascending, or Descending Triangles. Occasionally 
prices will break up through a broadening formation with a horizontal top 
line. If this occurs on high volume, an upward move of substantial 
proportions is likely to follow. An illustration of a Broadening 
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Formation can be found in Table X on page 105. 
Diamonds 
Diamond formations occur infrequently and almost never at 
bottom reversals . The development of a diamond requires fairly active 
markets. Diamon s appear most frequently around tops of major impor-
tance . As one would expect, breakouts from this pattern occur more 
frequently on the downside than on the upside. 
is shown in Chart XI, on page 112. 
An example of a Diamond 
Double and Triple Tops and Bottoms 
Double tops and bottoms are rar ely seen and the triple forms 
are even less frequent. In addition, it is not until prices have moved 
substantially away from these patterns that they can be accurately identi-
fied. For a Double Top Reversal to occur, two tops should appear at 
approximately the same level at least a month apart in time. In addition, 
there should be less volume accompanying the second advance than the 
first , and a dull and rounding type of recession between them. If 
prices then drop below the bottom of the valley between the two tops, a 
Double Top is indicated . A Double Bottom pattern is simply a Double 
Top upside down. Triple tops and bottoms have a third high or low 
which occurs on less volume than the second . 
is shown in Chart XII on page 113. 
A Triple Bottom formation 
All of the seven basic reversal formations just ~iscussed can 
and often do, indicate that a change in the major price trend of a stock 
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is developing . There are a few reversal formations which do not designate 
a major reversal but only a change in an issue's minor or intermediate 
trend. These formations are the Wedge, the One-Day Reversal, the Sell-
ing Climax and the Island Reversal . 
Wedge and One-Day Reversal 
A Wedge is a formation in which price fluctuations remain with-
in virtually straight lines which are converging and slope either up or 
down. It generally takes at least three weeks for a Wedge to be com-
pleted . Chart XIII on page 114 shows the Wedge formation which developed 
in Schenley Distillers in 1946 . A One-Day Reversal is a day of un-
usually high volume following a lengthy move in one direction. During 
that day prices first spurt ahead sharply and then drop back sharply to 
close virtually unchanged. Normally, the trend in existence at the 
end of the day will last at least another few days. 
Selling Climax and Island Reversal 
The Selling Climax is really a variation of the One-Day Reversal 
and is just what its name implies -- a final clean-up of distressed 
selling which may take a couple of days. As Island Reversal is a compact 
trading range separated from the move which preceded i t by a gap made by 
the opening price one day being above the high of the preceding day . 
The trading range is separated from the succeeding move in the opposite 
direction by a gap made by the opening price one day being below t ne 
lowest price of the preceding day. The gaps at either end should over-
lap so that the whole area stands out as an island on the chart. The 
Island Reversal pattern made by Bethlehem Steel in 1937 can be found on 
page 115 , Chart XIV. 
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Several of the patterns commented on thus far were mentioned 
as being formations which could mean that a consolidation of the main 
trend was taking place in preparation for a further move in the same 
direction. A couple of formations characteristic of consolidation 
only are the Flags and Pennants. Their names are derived from the fact 
that they look like flags and pennants . Charts XV and XVI on pages 115 
and 116 provide us with illustrations of these formations. 
Flags and Pennants 
A Flag is generally formed after a nearly vertical advance 
or decline which is the mast of the flag. If the Flag occurs during 
an uptrend, prices will usually then fluctuate narrowly for anywhere 
from a few days to three weeks. Each top and bottom is lower than its 
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predecessor . If the Flag occurs during a downtrend, each top and bottom 
will generally be higher than the preceding one. However, there are 
Flags which develop horizontally and there have been rare occasions of 
their sloping in the same direction as the preceding trend. As a Flag 
develops, trading tends to diminish. A Pennant is the same as a Flag 
except that it is bounded by converging lines and thus mi ght be described 
as a short, compact Wedge . 
In the book written by Magee and Edwards, gaps are treated as 
a topic separate from consolidation and reversal patterns . A chapter is 
devoted to them in which is included a discussion of the Island Reversal. 
There are numerous kinds of gaps -- the ex-dividend gap, area gap, break -
away gap, runaway gap , and exhaustion gap . However, none seem of 
sufficient importance to merit any discussion beyond simply indicating 
that they exist . 
SUPPORT AND RESISTANCE LEVELS 
Besides the various formations, Magee also attaches a great 
deal of significance to support and resistance levels as well as trend-
lines and channels. Support is defined as actual or potential buying 
sufficient to halt a downt rend in prices for an appreciable period . 
Resistance is considered to be just the reverse -- sufficient selling to 
prevent an upward move from continuing. 
Factors Determining Amount of Resistance 
The amount of resistance which a stock will meet at any given 
price will depend in part on the amount of stock previously bought at 
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that level by people who would now sell if they could do so without loss. 
For example, let us assume that several thousand shares of an issue changed 
hands during a selling climax and t hat prices subsequently dropped below 
that level . If prices eventually reach that high again, a large amount 
of the stock previously purchased at that level is likely to come onto 
the market . 
Generally, the farther that prices break below a bottom zone the 
greater is the amount of resistance when they return to that zone. For 
example, if a stock should decline from 50 to 40, stay around the latter 
level for a couple of weeks or more, subsequently rally to 45, and then 
decline to 38, investors who bought around 40 are not likely to be dis-
turbed about their purchase . There will be little or no disappointed 
selling on a rally to 40. If prices should dip to 36 before the rally 
starts, there might be a little selling at 40. However, if quotations 
should decline much below 36, say to 33 or less, many purchasers are 
likely to be unhappy with their selection and glad to have a chance to 
sell for their cost price. 
resistance level . 
Consequently, 40 will become an important 
A third determinant of the amount of resistance likely to be 
found at an old bottom level is the length of time which elapses before 
prices move back toward this point . Naturally, a bottom level only a 
year old is likely to provide more resistance than one that is four or 
five years old or older often provide considerable resistance if they 
have not been attacked in the interim. 
Support Estimated Same as Resistance 
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According to Magee, the principles involved in estimating 
potential support are exactly the same as those for estimating resistance. 
Whereas resistance is considered to develop at old bottoms as former 
buyers at that price welcome a chance to break even, support is considered 
to develop at old tops as former sellers at that level seek to reestablish 
their positions . Once a resistance level is broken through, it will 
function as a support level on any ensuing decline . If a decline goes 
through a support level, resistance will be encountered at that point on 
any subsequent advance. 
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Demand - Supply Usually In Close Balance 
Not much additional buying or selling may occur at many support 
or resistance points. However, according to Magee, the demand-supply 
situation of a stock is nearly ah-1ays a delicate thing. It often takes 
only a little extra selling to halt an advance and only a little extra 
buying to stop a decline. Traders who are watching the tape closely 
will be quick to act once it appears that a change in trend is developing. 
Consequently, orders to buy or sell only a few hundred shares can often 
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cause several thousand to be transferred. 
TRENDLINES AND CHANNELS 
The basic idea behind the drawing of trendlines and channels 
is that stocks do not tend to move in random fashion but instead move in 
trends. If a trend can be recognized in an early stage of development, 
large profits can often be made before a reversal takes place. To draw 
a trendline, it is necessary only to have two clearly established top or 
bottom reversal points. In the former case, a downward trendline would 
be drawn and in the latter an upward trendline. 
Breaking of Trendline 
By applying three criteria -- number of times a line has been 
tested, length of time it has held, and its angle of ascent - - it should 
be possible to judge if a line is an accurate indicator of the intermediate 
83. 
Ibid . , p. 215 . 
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trend of a stock. The question now arises of when a line should be 
considered as having been broken and thus the intermediate trend as 
having changed . A penetration of a trendline by 3% or better is always 
considered a valid signal . If volume expands as prices break through, 
additional confidence can be placed in the signal . In borderline cases, 
when the penetration has not quite reached 3%, the fact that volume has 
expanded appreciably would mean that t he trend should be considered as 
having changed. 
Should there be a borderline penetration without an increase in 
volume, a following rally should be watched carefully. If there is no 
pick- up of activity on the recovery and prices fail to close clearly 
above the trendline, the slightest sign of renewed selling should be con-
sidered as signifying a change in trend from up to down. 
Use of Channels 
It is often possible to draw a line through the tops of the 
rallies making up an intermediate advance which is roughly parallel to 
the basic trendline . The area between the two lines is called the trend 
channel . If a trend channel has become well established, failure of an 
advance to reach the top line often means that there is trouble ahead, 
probably a reversal of the stock's intermediate trend . The top of an 
upward channel is usually a good profit taking point for a person attempt-
ing to capitalize on short term market swings. 
MAGEE'S RECORD 
Now that we have discussed the approach used by Mr . Magee, let 
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us next consider the degree of success he has experienced with it. 
Magee publishes a weekly service in which he keeps a model account of 
20 stocks . In computing the progress of this portfolio, all costs are 
included. It is assumed that an initial investment of $1,000 is made 
in each security. 
Delta Evaluation Index 
Magee's opinion on the market as a whole is determined pri-
marily by his so-called Delta Bvaluation Index which presumably measures 
the strength of the market. The Index figure is a percentage derived 
by dividing the number of issues charted which look strong technically 
by the total number of issues charted. 
As one would expect, the larger the percentage, the greater 
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the number of long holdings the model account will have, the smaller 
the percentage, the more short holdings. Based on his experience, 
Magee has concluded that a position which is hedged, at least to a small 
degree, is usually the best one. He prefers to have a position that is 
partly long in strong appearing stocks and partly short in weak looking 
stocks than an all-out position either long or short. 
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There are two types of holdings - long holdings and short holdings. 
If a person feels a stock is going to advance and thus purchases it, 
he would have a long holding. Should he feel that a stock was 
going to decline and thus sold it short, he would have a short hold-
ing . 
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Tables Showing Results 1/57 -- 10/15/60 
On pages 104 and 107one will find tables showing how the 
model account performed during the period from the start of 1957 until 
the middle of October in 1960. Each table lists the positions currently 
open and shows the accured gain or loss on each holding at that particular 
time . These figures are totaled and then the net gain or loss established 
during the year is either added or subtracted . 
at the beginning of the year is subtracted. 
Next, the accrued gain 
In the first two tables, buying and selling expenses are not 
included in the individual computations . They are deducted in total 
at the end. Tables three and four, however, show the expenses figured 
on an individual basis for the positions still open pl us in total on 
the positions closed out . As one can see, gains of 7.3%, 25 . 2%, and 
3.4% were recorded in 1957, 58 , and 59, respectively, and a loss of 
13 . 7% through October 14 in 1960. 
Record Compared to Dow 
The most impressive performance was recorded in 1957. A gain 
of 7. 3% was shown by the model account while Dow declined around 12 1/2%. 
The gain of 25 . 2% turned in during the following year did not equal the 
33% advance by the Dow. In 1959, the performance was poor as the Dow 
advanced approximately 15 1/2%, or nearly five times as much as t he 3.4% 
gain recorded by Magee. 
decline by the Dow. 
The 19 60 showing was about in line with the 13% 
I f we add the four percentages together for both Magee and the 
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TABLE IX 
STATUS REPOK'f AS OF THE CLOSE OF 19 57 
Accrued: Basis $1000 
invested in each stock 
Positions open 
Bought 
at 
Close 
12/13/57 
Short 
at 
Divs . Divs. 
Rec'd Paid *No.Shrs . **Gain **Loss 
U.S. Tobacco 
Vick Chemical 
22-1/8 21-1/2 
42-1/2 47 
45 
23.75 
$ 
107 
$ 28 
Alum. Co. of Amer. 
Amer. Airlines 
Am. Smelt . Refng. 
Beaunit Mills 
Burroughs Corp . 
Celanese 
Comb . Engrg. 
Copper Range 
Danv. & Rio Grande RR 
General Motors 
Gran . City Steel 
Monsanto Chemical 
Phillips Petroleum 
Radio Corp. of Amer. 
Rayonier Inc . 
Textron 
Union Chemical 
Vanadium 
60 
14-1/8 
35-1/2 
10-1/4 
29-1/8 
11-1/2 
23- 3/4 
17-1/4 
34-1/2 
33-1/2 
28-1/2 
35 
36-5/8 
30-1/4 
14-7/8 
10-3/4 
20-1/4 
27-1/4 
75-1/4 
16-5/8 
50-1/8 
17-7/8 
39-5/8 
14-1/8 
29 -1/2 
46 -7/ 8 
36-1/4 
41 -1/2 
49 - 5/8 
33 -1/4 
44 -1/4 
33-1/2 
18 -7/8 
21 -1/8 
25 -1/2 
41 - 3/4 
.30 
. 75 
. 75 
• 25 
. 28 
2.00 
. 50 
1. 50 
. 25 
. 425 
1.00 
. 35 
. 75 
.30 
. 50 
13 
60 
20 
56 
25 
71 
34 
22. 05 
28 
24 
20 
30. 6 
23 
30 
53 
47 
39 
24 
194 
150 
278 
383 
256 
186 
186 
609 
49 
H>O 
393 
220 
68 
193 
452 
193 
336 
-1$4435 
-~9 
Total net accrued gain on open positions, 
long and short 
$4346 
* Adjusted for stock dividends or splits 
** Includes cash dividends rec'd. or paid. 
NET STATUS OF ALL RECOMMENDATIONS (Basis $1000 invested in each 
Net Total Accrued Gain to Date 
Net Total Realized Loss, 1957 
Net Total Accrued and Realized Gain 
Less Accrued Gain December 31, 1956 
Net Total Accrued and Realized, 1957, Gain 
Less all Costs 
Net Total 1957 Gain 
Percentage Gain 
stock) 
$4346 
-189 
$4157 
-1267 
$2890 
-1435 
$1455 
7.275% 
Source: "Stock Advisory Service, " John Magee, Jr. Technical Analysis of Stock 
Trends, (Springfield, Massachusetts, 1960) p . 27. 
61 
105. 
TABLE X 
STATUS REPORT AS OF THE CLOSE OF 1958 
Accrued: Basis $1000 
invested in each stock 
Bought Cloee Short Divs. Divs. 
Positions open at 12/31/58 at Rec'd. Paid *No Shrs. ;'~*Gain **Loss 
Cerro De Pasco 29-1/4 45 -1/4 $ . 45 34 $ 559 $ 
Gen. Tire & Rub. 28 46-7/8 . 35 37 711 
Haveg Ind . 32-1/ 2 51-1/ 2 . 25 31 597 
Hoffman Electron. 26-3/4 42-1/4 . 50 37 593 
Illinois Central 33-5/8 50-7/8 1.00 30 548 
Korvette 16-3/8 15 61 84 
Litton I nd . 45-7/8 83-1/8 22 820 
Minn. Mining 77-1/4 114-1/8 . 90 13 491 
National Lead 103- 3/4 111-3/4 1.00 10 90 
No. Am. Aviation 34 43-1/2 . 80 30 309 
Pepsi Cola 26-3/8 26-5/8 . 30 38 21 
Radio Corp. 34-3/8 47 -7/8 1.00 29 421 
Raytheon 20- 5/8 65 ')',48 . 3 2143 
Schenley Ind. 19-1/4 44 . 75 *52. 5 1337 
Sperry Rand 24-3/8 24-5/8 41 10 
Vick Chemical 42-1/2 86-1/4 ( bid ) 1. 60 *23.73 1076 
Vulcan Materials 14- 1/8 16 • 25 71 151 
West. Air Brake 31-7/8 32-3/8 31 16 
Chrysler 51-1/4 53 - 1/8 19 36 
Socony Mobil Oil 48 -3/8 47-1/4 21 24 
J$9929 $108 
-108 
Total net accrued gain on open positions, long and short J$9821 
' Adjusted for stock dividends or splits 
:* Includes cash dividends rec'd. or paid. 
NET STATUS OF ALL RECOMMENDATIONS (Basis, $1000 invested in each 
Net Total Accrued Gain to Date 
Net Total Realized Gain, 1958 
Total Accrued and Realized Gain 
Less Accrued Gain December 31, 1957 
Net Total Accrued and Realized, 1958, Profit 
Less all Costs 
Net Total 1958 Gain 
Percentage Gain 
stock) 
$ 9821 
+ 1626 
$11447 
- 4346 
$ 7101 
- 2068 
$ 5033 
25 . 105% 
Source: 11Stock Advisory Service, I John Magee, Jr. Technical Analysis of Stock Trends, 
(Springfield, Massachusetts, 1960) p . 28. 
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TABLE XI 
STATUS REPORT AS OF THE CLOSE OF 1959 
Accrued: Basis $1000 
invested in each stock 
Bought Close Short Divs . Divs. 
r sition open at 12/31/59 at Rec'd . Paid *No . Shrs . ~~Gain **Loss 
ner. Brdcstg.Para. 31-3/4 
_b.Tire & Rubber 82-7/8 
~ar Inc. 21 
.1kens Steel 95 
rtin Co. 47-7/8 
gma Copper 60 
1eem Mfg. Co . 27-1/8 
1eraton Corp. 19-5/8 
_udebaker-Packard 13-7/8 
1iv. Oil Products 24 
1rian Associates 42-5/8 
28-7/8 $ . 25 
79 
19-5/8 .10 
87-1/2 .so 
43-1/4 
56 -1/2 
27-3/8 
20- 3/8 . 30 
21- 3/4 
26- 3/8 
45 
31 
12 
47 
10 
20 
16 
36 
so 
72 
41 
23 
9 
53 
567 
97 
55 
81 
47 
60 
70 
93 
56 
i.ck Chemical 21-1/4 88-1/8 1. 65 47 . 46 3252 
erican Viscose 42-1/2 43-1/4 23 
ver & Rio Grande lfest. 17-5/8 17-1/2 . 25 57 
>tern Airlines 33-3/8 34 29 
eral Motors 54-1/ 2 55-1/8 .so 18 
linois Central 44-3/4 47-1/8 .so 21 
rritt -Chapman Scott 16-3/4 19-1/2 • 90 51 
vlon 51- 3/4 53-3/8 .so 18 
thern Railway 53-1/4 51 19 
Total net accrued gain on open positions, long and 
short 
Adjusted for stock dividends or splits 
Includes cash dividends rec'd. or paid 
NET STATUS OF ALL RECOMMENDATIONS (Basis $1000 invested in each 
Net Total Accrued Gain to Date 
Net Total Realized Gain, 1959 
Total Accrued and Realized Gain 
Less Accrued Gain December 31, 1958 
Net Total Accrued and Realized, 1959, Gain 
Percentage Gain 
17 
18 
2 
39 
94 
20 
/-$4223 
-471 
$3752 
stock) 
$3,752 
+6 , 855 
$ 10,607 
-9' 821 
21 
43 
-$471 
$ 786 (after costs) 
3.93% 
Source : "Stock Advisory Service , " John Magee, Jr . , Technical Analysis of Stock 
Trends, (Springfield, Massachusetts, 1960) p . 29. 
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TABLE XII 
STATUS OF MODEL ACCOUNT OCTOBER 14, 1960 
Accrued: Basis, $1000 
invested in each stock 
Bought Close *No 
Positions open at l0/14 
Short 
at 
Divs . Divs . 
Rec'd . Paid Shrs . **Gain **Loss 
Bulova Watch 22 19-1/8 $.15 45 
Campbell Red Lake 15 - 1/8 14-7/8 66 
Fansteel Met. 62- 7/8 54-1/4 . 25 15 
Lionel Corp . 28-3/8 28-1/2 35 4 
Studebaker-Pack . 10-3/4 l0-5/8 93 
Sun Chemical 17-1/8 15 . 15 58 
ACF Industries 37- 1/4 48-3/4 $1. 87~ 20 193 
Chrysler 43-1/2 61.- 5/8 . 75 16 278 
Colgate- Palm. 30-3/4 34 . 30 29 86 
Colorado Fuel & Iron 17 *21-3/4 45 . 9 218 
Denver & Rio Grande 15-3/4 17-1/2 1.00 57 43 
Georgia- Pacific 48-7/8 48-3/8 20 
Goodyear Tire & Rub. 35-7/8 35- 1/8 28 
Illinois Central 30-1/8 47 - 1/ 8 2.00 21 315 
Outboard Marine 20-1/2 28-1/4 . 20 35 264 
Raytheon 35-1/8 36- 1/8 27 27 
Royal Dutch 35 *39 .99 25.5 77 
Southern Railway 43- 1/4 51 2. 10 19 107 
Tidewater Oil 19/58 *20/58 48.3 48 
loiestinghouse Elect. 50-3/8 48-1/8 20 
Total Net accrued gain on open positions, long anu f.$1660 
short, -469 
$1191 
* Adjusted for stock dividends or splits. 
** Includes cash dividends rec'd. or paid . 
NET STATUS OF ALL RECOMMENDATIONS (Basis $1000 invested in each stock) 
Net Total Accrued Gain to Date $1,191 
Net Total Realized Loss, 1960 - 183 
Net Total Accrued and Realized, Gain $1,008 
Less Accrued Gain December 31, 1959 -3,752 
123 
17 
126 
12 
115 
10 
21 
45 
-$469 
Net Total Accrued and Realized, 1960, Loss $2,744 (after costs) 
Percentage Loss 13 . 7% 
Source: " Stock Advisory Service," John Magee, Jr., (Springfield, Massachuset ts, 
October 15, 1960), p . 1 . 
Dow, we find that the net totals differ little. The Dow had a net 
gain of 23% and the model portfolio gained 22. 2%. The author believes 
that a satisfactory showing was made, especially since Magee maintained 
a hedged position and thus limited his risks . 
Conclusion 
In this section we have shown that the approach used by Magee 
is a complicated one. Consequently, ,.,.e can reasonably conclude that, 
if at all possible , anyone using this method should obtain access to 
Magee 's Service. Any person attempting to use the method on his own 
should plan to spend a considerable amount of time studying it . A 
study of Magee's record has indicated that those who master the approach 
can expect to achieve results closely in line wi th the performance of 
the Dow. Risks are limited by the maintenance of a hedged position. 
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SECTION VIII 
RELATIVE MARKET PERFORMANCE 
A basic principle of sound investing is to keep one's losses 
small and let one's profits grow. One of the main reasons for Darvas' 
success was his adherence to this principle. However, many investors 
find that following such a policy conflicts with their basic instincts 
since it often necessitates holding stocks which seem overpriced on a 
fundamental basis and selling issues which appear undervalued. 
There are several services whose position on individual sec-
urities is based primarily on their price performance. Of these 
services, we are going to discuss Investors Research . As indicated in 
the introduction, it is the only one which maintains a model account. 
After finishing this section, the reader should feel that there is a 
great deal in favor of the Investors Research approach of buying and 
holding only stocks whose basic price trend is upward. 
INVESTORS RESEARCH APPROACH 
detail. 
Let us now consider the Investors Research approach in more 
According to that organization, the most serious, single mis -
take investors make is failing to sell or switch a stock which is clearly 
trending downward in price. A second costly, common mistake is purchas-
ing an issue because it appears ' cheap" compared to its recent price. 
Another common error is selling because a stock seems ' 'high . ' 
briefly discuss each of these' 'mistakes. " 
We will 
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Stocks in Downtrend Should be Sold 
Investors who re·tain stocks in clearly established price down-
trends must believe a recovery will eventually occur. According to 
Investors Research, this hope plays the villain's role. Eventually, 
the investor \vho allows this hope to dominate his investment thinking 
will build up a portfolio comprised only of poor performers . . 
As an example of the wisdom of selling poor acting stocks, 
Investors Research cites the performance of Rheem Mfg. In March of 
1957, this issue had been in a price downtrend for about 20 months. 
The longer term price trend turned down in August of 1955 with the issue 
selling for 36 . By July of 1956 it was public knowledge that the fund-
amental picture had deteriorated as the dividend was omitted. However , 
the fact that the price trend was down had been known for many months . 
Before the trend reversed itself quotations for the issue declined more 
than two-thirds. 
11Cheap11 Stocks Often Poor Buys 
Purchasers of a stock because it appears " cheap" frequently 
overlook the fact that many shares of the issue are held by people who 
bought at higher prices. Many of these investors may decide to accept 
their loss. The effect of this selling will naturally be to prolong 
the downtrend. Most of those holding the "overhead supply" \vill probably 
continue to hold in the hope of "getting out even. '1 Consequently, if 
the issue should begin to advance, stock will be sold by those who wanted 
to obtain their original purchase price. We can now see why stocks 
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which look cheap fundamentally often have difficulty making much headway. 
Losses Should Be Sold First 
Investors Research believes that issues showing a loss should 
always be sold first '"hen stocks are liquidated, Ultimately, every 
stock in a price uptrend will turn d0\'17nward. However, Investors Research 
feels that sale is advisable only after the trend has reversed, and that 
a stock should not be sold on the gamble that the trend may reverse . 
In other words, a stock should be retained as long as it is trending 
upwar d in price. 
Basic Position 
The basic position of Investors Research is summarized by the 
following paragraph: 
84. 
11 Time and again in our personal interviews with clients 
from all parts of the world, we are called upon to ex-
plain the persistence of trends. As human beings we 
tend to think negatively when faced with a set of cir-
cumstances which are beyond our control as individuals . 
The average investor faced with the purchase of a common 
stock which has advanced in price rea£ts negatively. 
He assumes that the trend will reverse! Actually, just 
the opposite is generally true . The clue to the future 
lies in the immediate past, and the fact that a trend, 
once established, tends to continue. 11 84 
Trend of Market Important 
As we would expect, Investors Research believes that reserve 
A Positive Investment Program for Today - - And Through 1960. 
(Investors Research Co . , Santa Barbara, California), 1958, p . 2 . 
positions should vary according to the primary trend of the market . 
If the trend is upward,use of credit in moderate amounts is advised. 
When the trend is downward, a reserve of up to 60% of invested funds 
is recommended. Consequently, it is apparent that the record of 
Investors Research depends on the accuracy of its market position as 
well as the performance of its individual selections. 
Invest in Strong Industries and Strong Stocks 
Investments are concentrated in those industries showing the 
most favorable market action. Each •o~eek Investors Research ranks 45 
different industries. The industry outperforming the market to the 
widest extent is ranked number one; the industry under the most selling 
pressure is ranked number 45, etc. 
Investors Research believes in investing not only in the 
strongest industries but also in the best acting stocks in these groups . 
It compares the market performance of more than 500 leading listed stocks 
wihh a broad 450 stock average. Long-term and short-term price trends 
ratings are given in the form of a two letter code. 
are shown by Table XIII on page 121 . 
The various ratings 
Short -term ratings are not accorded as much weight as long-term 
ratings. The long-term rating (three to six months) is represented by 
the first letter in the code and the short-term (one to t nree months) 
by the second letter. A B rating signifies a better than average price 
trend; N denotes a neutral trend; S denotes a b~low average trend. 
120. 
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TABLE XIII ~'r 
Investors Research Rating in Order of Strength 
Strongest Rating No. 1 1 BB 
2 BN 
3 NB 
4 BS 
5 NN 
6 SB 
7 NS 
8 SN 
Weakest Rating No . 9 9 ss 
* Taken from the booklet 'Profits through Research, " (Investors Research 
Co., Santa Barbara, California, 1959,) p. 9 . 
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Comparative Strength Index Numbers 
Comparative Strength Index Numbers comprise an integral part 
of the Investors Research selection system. 
the 450 stock average is considered normal . 
The market performance of 
It is given an index number 
of 100. Index numbers of industries and individual stocks indicate 
deviations from normal. A stock with an index number of 115 would be 
performing 15% better than average; one with an index number of 85 
would be acting 15% worse than average . Every issue can be compared 
with every other issue and each industry group. 
RECORD OF INVESTORS RESEARCH 
If possible, Investors Research likes to purchase issue s which 
appear undervalued from a fundamental standpoint. However, the essence 
of this approach is to buy stocks with rising index numbers and sell 
issues which are trending downward. Now, let us consider what degree of 
success that organization has experienced with its policy of buying and 
holding only strong stocks. 
Model Account 
Investors Research started a model account on July 1, 1958, 
with the Dow standing at 478, 82. An initial investment of $100,000 was 
considered to have been made. The value of the portfolio, after deduct-
ing all expenses connected with the theoretical transactions undertaken, 
had risen to $165,228,71 by January 5, 1961. 
the Dow advanced to 628.35. 
During the same interval, 
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In other words, the model account recorded a 65 1/2% gain, as 
agains t a 23.8% gain by the Dow. At no time did the reserve position 
exceed 30%. Stocks purchased for this portfolio included Goodyear Tire, 
Florida Power & Light , American Home Product, IBM, Minnesota Mining, 
General Electric, Minneapolis- Honneywell, Eastman Kodak, Texas Instruments, 
Upjohn, and American Tobacco. 
Conclusion 
The performance of the model account makes a strong case for 
the Investors Research approach. We can conclude that it is sound pro-
cedure to buy and hold only issues which are performing well. Whether 
or not this approach and the Magee approa ch are sounder than buying and 
holding issues which look cheap on fundamentals is a question which we 
will attempt to answer in the next section. 
124. 
SECTION IX 
X SERVICE ON INDIVIDUAL STOCKS 
We have found that Magee's record on individual stocks was a 
satisfactory one. In addition, we found that Investors Research 
achieved excellent results during the period studied. Now that we know 
what can be achieved with a sound technical approach to specific issues, 
the next step is to ascertain what a sound fundamental approach is likely 
to accomplis h. As in the case of the market as a whole, the record of 
X Service will be used for comparative purposes . 
STOCK SELECTIONS -- FORECAST REPORTS 
In its Annual Forecast Reports, X Service not only makes a 
precise forecast of what it expects the Dow's range to be during the 
following twelve months but also selects 20 stocks it believes will be 
outstanding performers during this period . The Semi-Annual Forecatt 
Bulletin contains ten selections expected to record an above average 
performance during the next six months. It is apparent that we have an 
excellent basis on which to judge the accuracy of X Service in picking 
individual issues. 
On pages 1.26 through 136 are tables snowing the stocks selected 
in the ten Annual and Semi-Annual Forecast bulletins beginning with 
December 12, 1955. The tables aleo reveal how each issue performed in 
the next six or twelve months and how the performance of each group of 
selections compared with the action of the Dow during the period covered. 
These tables are included to show the type of issues selected by X Service 
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and thus make the record of that organization more meaningful. 
RECORD COMPARED WITH MAGEE, I NVESTORS RESEARCH 
From Table XXIII on page 135, we can see that six groups of 
selections outperformed the Dow while four did not do as well. Table 
XXIV on page 136 also indicates that the overall record for the five years 
was not as good as the performance of the Dow. While the total for the 
changes in t ne Dow was +27.6%, the selections nad a plus total of only 20.5%. 
We saw earlier that during the period from January 1, 19 ~ 7 
through October 14, 1958, Magee's model account advanced 22.2%. This 
rise was 0 . 08% less than the percentage gain by the Dow of 23 . 0%. 
From July 1, 1958 to January 6, 1961, the investment account of Investors 
Research advanced 65 . 2% . During the same interval, the Dow rose 23. 8%. 
Investors Research and Magee both outperformed X Service. 
Moreover, there is one further factor which should be considered in 
addition to the percentages mentioned in the two preceding paragraphs, 
Whereas Magee and Investors Research deducted all expenses connected 
with each theoretical transaction, no costs were considered in the com-
putations for X Service. 
Conclusion 
Based on the records of X Service, Magee, and Investors Research, 
we can conclude that sound technical methods are l ikely to produce better 
individual selections than fundamental studies. Consequently, it seems 
clear that when making his decisions on individual stocks the investor 
should place primary emphasis on technical considerations. 
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TABLE XIV 
PERFORMANCE OF 
SELECTIONS*~k DECEMBER 12, 1955 
PRICE PRICE PERCENTAGE PRICE 
DEC. 12, 1955 DEC. 3, 1956 CHANGE ADVANCE OR DECLINE 
Anaconda 71 
Bridgeport Brass 46 
Caterpillar Tractor 61 
Ganeral Precision 44 
Lone Star Cement 72 
North American Aviation 79 
Pullman 71 
Texas Co. 119 
U.S. Steel 60 
rJarner-Lambert 42 
Florida Pr. & Lt. 37 
National Lead 85 
Spencer Chemical 72 
Sperry Rand 25 
Thompson Products 51 
Am. Ag. Chemical 72 
Cluett Peabody 45 
Louisville & Nashville 89 
May Departmant Stores 42 
Reynolds Tobacco 54 
*75 
37 
89 
**35 
81 
80 
64 
120 
68 
41 
44 
108 
54 
22 
71 
60 
43 
87 
39 
52 
/-4 
-9 
/-28 
-9 
/-9 
f.l 
-7 
/-1 
/-8 
-1 
f.7 
/-23% 
-18 
-3 
/-20 
-12 
- 2 
-2 
-3 
-2 
Net Advance 2.3% 
Dow Off 2.0% 
* Price October 29, 1956 when sale advised 
** Price October 22, 1956 when sale advised 
*** Taken from the December 12, 1955 issue of X Service. 
/-6% 
-20% 
/-46% 
-20% 
/-13% 
/-1% 
-11% 
/-1% 
/-13% 
/-2% 
/-19% 
/-27% 
-25% 
-12% 
/-39% 
-17% 
-4% 
-2% 
-7% 
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TABLE XV 
PERFORMANCE OF 
SELECTIONS* JUNE 11, 1956 
PRICE PRICE PRICE PERCENTAGE 
JUNE 11z 1956 DEC. 2z 1957 CHANGE ADVANCE OR DECLINE 
Hilton Hotels 49 46 -3 -6% 
Lone Star Cement 77 81 /-4 /-5% 
Standard Oil of Cal. 51 44 -7 -14% 
Union Carbide 119 106 -13 -11% 
Vanadium 48 44 -4 - 8'7o 
Colgate-Palmolive 57 41 -16 -28% 
Duquesne Light 37 36 -1 - 3% 
Reynolds Tobacco 54 52 - 2 - 4% 
Seaboard Finance 18 17 -1 - 6% 
Stone & Webster 33 33 
Net Decline 7.5% 
Dow Off 0.6% 
* Taken from the June 11, 1956 issue of X Service. 
TABLE XVI 
PERFORMANCE OF 
SELECTIONS* DECEMBER 10, 1956 
Boeing 
Cities Service 
First Nat'l . City Bank 
Ford 
Ingersoll Rand 
McGraw-Edison 
Penn-Dixie Cement 
Union Carbide 
U.S. Steel 
Vanadium 
American Cyanamid 
Continental Can 
Houston Lt . & Pr. 
National Lead 
Phillips Petroleum 
Ass. Dry Goods 
Commercial Credit 
Norfolk & Western 
Reynolds Tobacco 
Stone & Webster 
PRICE PRICE 
DEC.lO, 1956 DEC.21, 1957 
62 
69 
68 
56 
80 
74 
36 
116 
72 
47 
75 
47 
51 
111 
54 
34 
47 
69 
54 
34 
38 
53 
60 
42 
67 
68 
23 
94 
54 
29 
86 
42 
55 
104 
42 
31 
48 
54 
63 
42 
Net Decline 
Dow Off 
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PRICE PERCENTAGE 
CHANGE ADVANCE OR DECLINE 
-14 
-16 
- 8 
-14 
-13 
- 6 
-13 
-22 
-18 
-18 
/-11 
- 5 
/-4 
- 7 
-12 
- 3 
f. 1 
-15 
f. 9 
f. 8 
11.7% 
8.2% 
-23% 
-27'/o 
-12% 
-25% 
-16% 
- 8% 
-36% 
-19% 
-25% 
-38% 
/-15% 
-11% 
f. 8% 
- 6% 
-22% 
- 9% 
f. 2% 
-22% 
/-17% 
/-24% 
-233% 
* Taken from the December 10, 1956 issue of X Service. 
Caterpillar Tractor 
C. B.S. 
Monsanto 
Standard Oil of Cal. 
Westinghouse 
Allis-Chalmers 
Duquesne Light 
May Dept. Stores 
Norfolk & Western 
Seaboard Finance 
TABLE XVII 
PERFORMANCE OF 
SELECTIONS* JUNE 17, 1957 
PRICE PRICE 
JUNE 11, 1957 DEC. 2, 1957 
95 
33 
38 
57 
65 
34 
36 
39 
67 
17 
64 
25 
35 
49 
64 
26 
34 
37 
54 
16 
Net Decline 
Dow Off 
* Taken from the June 17, 1957 issue of X Service. 
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PRICE PERCENTAGE 
CHANGE ADVANCE OR DECLINE 
-31 
- 8 
- 3 
- 8 
- 1 
- 8 
- 2 
- 2 
- 13 
- 1 
14% 
11.9% 
-33% 
- 24% 
- 8% 
-14% 
- 2% 
- 24% 
- 5% 
- 5% 
-19% 
- 6% 
-140% 
TABLE XVIII 
PERFORMANCE OF 
SELECTIONS***DECEMBER 9, 1957 
PRICE PRICE PRICE PERCENTAGE 
DEC. 9, 1957 DEC.ll , 19 58 CHANGE ADVANCE OR DECLINE 
Firestone 93 
Florida Pr. & Lt. 54 
Food Fair 36 
Food Machinery 50 
Gen. Am. Transportation 71 
IBM 317 
Texas Co . 65 
Texas Utilities 47 
Warner-Lambert 61 
Westinghouse 64 
El Paso 27 
Filtro1 40 
General Telephone 41 
Owens-Illinois Glass 57 
Texas Instruments 25 
Ass . Dry Goods 30 
Gillette 36 
Northern States Power 16 
Seaboard Finance 17 
Sutherland Paper 33 
* Price May 12, 1958 when sale advised. 
** Price July 7, 1958 when sale advised. 
*86 
82 
37 
78 
101 
438 
82 
61 
83 
66 
32 
41 
55 
82 
**40 
44 
48 
22 
22 
37 
Net Advance 
Dow Up 
*** Taken from the December 9, 1957 issue of X Service. 
-7 
/-28 
1-1 
/-28 
/-30 
fl21 
/-17 
/-14 
/-22 
/-2 
/-5 
/-1 
/-14 
/-25 
/-15 
/-14 
/-12 
/-6 
/-5 
/-4 
29 . 9% 
26. 6% 
- 8% 
/-52% 
/-3% 
/-5 6% 
/-42% 
/-38% 
/-26% 
/-30% 
/-36% 
/-3% 
/-19% 
/-3% 
/-34% 
/-44% 
/-60% 
/-47% 
/-33% 
/-38% 
/-29% 
/-12% 
597% 
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TABLE XIX 
PERFORMANCE OF 
SELECTIONS* JUNE 6, 1958 
PRICE PRICE PRICE PERCENTAGE 
JUNE 16, 1958 DEC. 1, 1958 CHANGE ADVANCE 
Arkansas La. Gas 32 40 f.l2 f.3 8% 
International Telephone 36 52 f.l6 f.44% 
Lone Star Cement 33 34 f.l f. 3% 
Raytheon 30 50 f.20 /-67% 
Texas Co. 70 82 f.l2 f.l7% 
American Tobacco 86 90 f.4 f.5% 
Marine Midland 22 23 /-1 /- 5io 
May Department Stores 41 44 /-3 /-7% 
Norfolk & Western 62 85 /-23 /-37% 
Southern Natural Gas 39 41 /-2 /-5% 
228% 
Net Advance 22 . 8% 
Dow Up 18. 5% 
* Taken from the June 6, 1958 issue of X Service. 
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TABLE XX 
PERFORMANCE OF 
SELECTIONS** DECEMBER 8, 1958 
PRICE PRICE PRICE PERCENTAGE 
DEC. 8 , 1958 NOV.30,1959 CHANGE ADVANCE OR DECLINE 
Anaconda 57 61 }4 }7% 
Baltimore & Ohio 42 39 -3 -7% 
Celanese 27 27 
Cerro de Pasco 43 40 -3 -7% 
Cooper-Bessemer 33 37 }4 fl2% 
Fibreboard 46 49 }3 }7% 
International Telephone 54 80 }26 }48% 
Mallory 36 40 }4 }11% 
Vanadium 34 30 -4 -12% 
Whirlpool 29 31 }2 }7% 
ACF-Wrigley 24 15 -9 - 38% 
Continental Can 58 45 -13 -22% 
Fidelity-Phoenix 60 56 -4 -7% 
Pennsalt 79 87 }8 }10% 
Texas Co. 85 79 - 6 -7% 
American Tel. & Tel. 200 231 }31 }16% 
Archer-Daniels 44 39 - 5 -11% 
May Dept. Stores 46 48 }2 }4% 
Southern Natural Gas 41 * 44 }3 }7% 
Southern Railway 52 51 - 1 -2% 
}16% 
Net Advance 0. 8% 
Dow Up 16. 4% 
*Price March 23, 1959 when sale advised. 
** Taken from the December 8, 1958 issue of X Service. 
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TABLE XXI 
PERFORMANCE OF 
SELECTIONS* JUNE 15, 1959 
PRICE PRICE PRICE PERCENTAGE 
JUNE 102 1959 NOV. 30 2 1959 CHANGE ADVANCE OR DECLINE 
Am. Machine & Foundry 79 100 /-21 f.27% 
American Smelting 46 50 f.4 f.9 % 
Ferro 37 40 f. 3 /-8% 
Standard Packaging 31 33 f.2 f.6% 
United Air Lines 38 37 -1 -3% 
Archer-Daniels 45 39 - 6 -13% 
Diana Stores 18 22 f.4 /-22% 
Murphy (G.C.) 46 47 f.l /-2% 
Southern Railway 55 51 -4 -7% 
Stone & Webster 61 60 -1 -2% 
f.49% 
Net Advance 4 .9% 
Dow Up 4.0% 
* Taken from the June 15, 1959 issue of X Service. 
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TABLE XXII 
PERFORMANCE OF 
SELECTIONS* DECEMBER 7,1959 
PRICE PRICE PRICE PERCENTAGE 
DEC. 7, 1959 DEC. l3,1960 CHANGE ADVANCE OR DECLINE 
Aerojet General 66 
Air Reduction 79 
Arkansas La. Gas 63 
Caterpillar Tractor 31 
C1evite 45 
Ford 80 
International Tel. & Tel. 40 
Jones & Laughlin 80 
Standard Packaging 34 
United Fruit 27 
Eastman Kodak 107 
Firestone Tire & Rubber 132 
General Telephone 78 
Ins. Co. of No. Am. 130 
IBM 433 
Melville Shoe 27 
Murphy (G. C.) 48 
New England E1 . System 20 
Norfolk & Western 100 
Stone & \~ebster 55 
53 
77 
72 
31 
58 
64 
44 
55 
22 
16 
112 
102 
80 
143 
590 
29 
49 
22 
96 
50 
-13 
- 2 
f 9 
/-13 
-16 
f 4 
-25 
-12 
-11 
f 5 
-30 
f 2 
/-13 
/-157 
f 2 
f 1 
f 2 
- 4 
- 5 
Net Decline 2.9% 
Dow Off 8 . 0% 
~ 1a~e~ f!OU the December 7, 1959 issue of X Service . 
-19 . 7% 
- 2. 5% 
/-14.3% 
/- 28 . 9% 
- 20.0% 
/-10.0% 
- 31. 3% 
- 35 • 3i'o 
-40.7% 
f 4 . 7% 
- 22 .7% 
f 2. 6% 
/-10.0% 
/-36. 3% 
f 7 • 4i'o 
f 2. 1% 
/-10. 0% 
- 4 .0% 
- 9 .1% 
- 59% 
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TABLE XXIII 
PERFORMANCE OF 
SELSCTIONS* JUNE 13, 1960 
PRICE PRICE PRICE PERCENTAGE 
JUNE 13z 1960 DEC.12z1960 CHANGE ADVANCE OR DECLINE 
Commercial Solvents 21 20 -1 -4.8% 
Jones & Laughlin 69 55 -14 -20. 3% 
Magna vox 52 42 -10 -19.2% 
Mallory (P.R.) 46 37 
- 9 -19. 6% 
Warner-Lambert 69 74 /-5 f.7. 2% 
American Tobacco 57 62 f5 f 8 . 8% 
Melville Shoe 27 29 f2 /-7.4% 
Norfolk & lvestern 101 96 -5 -5 . 0% 
New England El. System 21 22 /-2 /-4 . 8% 
Seaboard Finance 22 22 
-40.7% 
Net Decline 4 .1% 
Dow Off 6. 9% 
* Taken from the June 13, 1960 issue of X Service . 
DATE OF 
SELECTIONS 
12/12/55 
6/11/56 
12/10/56 
6/17/ 57 
12/9/5 7 
6/6/58 
12/8/58 
6/15/59 
12/7/59 
6/13/60 
TABLE XXIV 
OVER -ALL PERFORMANCE OF 
SELECTIONS OF X SERVICE* 
PERCENTAGE 
ADVANCE 
2.3 
29 . 9 
22.8 
0.8 
4.9 
60.7 
PERCENTAGE 
DECLINE 
7. 5 
11.7 
14.0 
2.9 
4.1 
40.2 
* 
Taken from various issues of X Service 1955-60. 
CHANGE IN 
DOW 
-2. 3% 
-0.6% 
-8 .2% 
-11. 9% 
/-26. 6% 
/-18. 5% 
/-16 . 4% 
/-4.0% 
- 8. 0% 
- 6.9% 
/-27.6% 
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There is one further point which should be mentioned . We 
have seen that even Investors Research attempts to find stocks which appear 
to be attractive values from a fundamental standpoint. As opposed to 
the situation regarding the market as a whole, technical and fundamental 
methods can effectively complement each other in the case of individual 
stocks . 
For exampl~, if two issues are equally attractive from a tech-
nical standpoint, it is apparent that the one which is the better funda-
mental value would be the better purchase . Technical systems for in-
dividual issues all place primary emphasis on market performance and 
thus do not effectively complement each other. 
137. 
138. 
CONCLUSION 
The main objective of this paper has been to determine whether 
technical systems should be given primary emphasis in investment plann-
ing. We have considered the records of Drew, Neill, Lowry, Bank 
Credit Analyst, Barron 's Confidence Index, Magee, Investors Research, 
and X Service. In the case of both t he market and individual stocks , 
the technical systems had a more impressive record than X Service . 
Consequently, it seems unlikely that those people interviewed by the 
author who place chief emphasis on fundamentals are following procedures 
as sound as those who attach main emphasis to technical factors. 
We decided earlier that as far as the market as a whole is 
concerned, fundamentals should probably be disregarded completely and 
as many sound technical methods followed as possible. The situation 
is different where individual stocks are concerned. Whereas similar 
technical opinions on the marke t reinforce each other, it is similar 
technical and fundamental opinions which reinforce each other on specific 
issues . 
Based on the results of our studies, we would consider an 
issue's relative market performance to be the most important single 
factor to consider when judging the investment merits of a stock. 
However, we would feel more confident buying or holding a stock wh ich 
was performing well and also appeared to be an attractive fundamental 
value than an issue which showed up well only from the standpoint ~f 
relative market action. 
To sum up, our s tudies indicate that an investor should pla ce 
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primary emphasis on technical factors . Where the entire market is 
concerned, fundamentals should probably be ignored. In the case of 
individual stocks, a strong fundamental picture adds considerable weight 
to a strong technical pattern. 
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